7

THOUGHTS

ON THE

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER,

AND

RIGHT OF THE CROWN,

IN THE BESTOWAL OF

PLACES AND PENSIONS.

[Price Two Shillings.]

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ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER,
AND
RIGHT OF THE CROWN,
IN THE BESTOWAL OF
PLACES AND PENSIONS:
HUMBLY SUBMITTED TO THE ATTENTION OF
THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND IN GENERAL,
AND
ELECTORS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
IN PARTICULAR.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN APPENDIX;
CONTAINING

The Several SPEECHES in Favour of a PLACE-BILL, delivered in the HOUSE OF COMMONS, in the Year 1739.

Alſo a Liſt of PLACEMEN and PENSIONERS in the Houſe of Commons, and of thoſe Members who voted for Mr. Wilkes's Expulſion, Colonel Luttrell's Election, and the Commitment of the late Lord Mayor of London to the Tower.

Nullæ ſunt occultiores inſidiæ, quam eæ quæ latent in ſimulatione officii, aut in aliquo neceſſitudinis nomine.

Cic. in Verrem. ii. *L.* i. *C.* xv.

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PREFACE.

THE following thoughts are offered to the public from a full perſuaſion that the ſubject demands the ſerious attention of every lover of his country. The author hopes that its importance will procure it ſome notice; and that the following pages will be read at firſt calmly and candidly, for the ſake of the argument; and then with ever ſo much zeal and warmth for the ſake of the cauſe.

He is fully perſuaded, that, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, the people muſt act for themſelves; and that liberty will be inevitably loſt, if they do not exert every conſtitutional method for its ſecurity. One chief end in publiſhing the following thoughts, is, to convince the people that this is the true ſtate of the caſe, by ſhewing them that they cannot reaſonably expect any redreſs from their repreſentatives, who have been prevailed upon, by the very abuſes we here expoſe, to betray and reſign their liberties.

This general corruption, and violation of duty and principle, have

given

given riſe to a very falſe and dangerous opinion, *viz.* that there is no patriotic virtue remaining among us; and that all pretended ſtruggles for liberty, is only a ſordid contention for places, penſions, and honours, and who ſhall have the largeſt ſhare of the public plunder.

Perhaps the characters of ſome may give room for ſuch ſuſpicion and charge; but ſhall the characters of a few affect the whole? Can we pay ſo poor a compliment to liberty, as to think, that ſo noble, ſo glorious a cauſe, a cauſe that comprehends every ſocial and civil bleſſing, the cauſe of heaven and of man, has no ſincere,

diſintereſted, zealous eſpouſers? Or that, degenerate as we are, we cannot find men of pure principles and honour?—We can: there are thoſe who will, at every hazard, protect our liberties. We have men ſincerely attached to the cauſe, who have heads to plan, and hearts to execute any ſchemes for the public good. Let but the people ſtand forth, and nobly aſſert their liberties, and they will ſoon find men of integrity and virtue to patronize and ſupport them.

The author has not inſerted any of the notes out of pedantic oſtentation; they almoſt all occurred as he wrote:

wrote: they are deſigned to ſhew that the great principles and maxims of government, upon which we reaſon, have been received, and advanced by the wiſeſt men of all ages. By this means he hopes to avoid the party cenſure, that the doctrine here contended for, is not founded in ſound policy, but only the temporary refuge of thoſe who oppoſe the *preſent ſyſtem*. Not that it requires much depth of learning, or profound enquiry, to convince us, that the preſent adminiſtration of government, if government it can be called, muſt be deſtructive to liberty. Such pernicious influence prevails, and has long prevailed, at court, in our counſels,

ſels, and ſenate, as has brought government into contempt; thrown the conſtitution quite off its natural poiſe, by ſhaking its foundations; alarmed the people, by aiming a blow at their liberties; and ſo far deſtroyed all dignity of office, that the firſt magiſtrate, to ſay no worſe, *ſtet magni nominis umbra.*

With reſpect to the method propoſed for remedying the comprehenſive evils of which we complain, as well as the whole performance, the author offers the obſervation of the ingenious and learned writer on the principles of penal law, in excuſe for his attempt.

"The

"The Britiſh conſtitution is the "pride of every Briton: to ſecure, "to fortify, to perpetuate that ex- "cellent ſyſtem of government, is "the buſineſs of every Briton. It "may be pardonable therefore in "me to point out what I conceive "to be the beſt method of accom- "pliſhing the reformation in queſ- "tion; leaving the execution of that "method, or the adoption of a "better plan, to thoſe who lie under "the more immediate engagement "both of intereſt and duty."

THERE is nothing requires more wiſdom and prudence, than the regulation of that portion which is taken from, and of that which is left to, the ſubject. To fix theſe revenues in a proper manner, regard ſhould be had both to the neceſſities of the ſtate, and thoſe of the ſubject.

The real wants of the people ought never to give way to the imaginary wants of the ſtate.

Often has it happened, that miniſters of a reſtleſs diſpoſition have imagined, that the wants of the ſtate were thoſe of their own little and ignoble ſouls.

Spt. of Laws, B. 13. C. 1.

IN ſuch times as theſe, and under ſuch an adminiſtration of government as we have experienced for ſeveral years, it is almoſt impoſſible to ſtand by an idle, or unaffected ſpectator.

Every man that has any regard for himſelf, or zeal for his country, muſt take ſome part, and declare, as he finds himſelf intereſted, for one ſide or the other. It is not only every man's *right*, but *duty*, *now*

to do this.—A few formalities of ſtate, or nice diſquiſitions of law, are not in queſtion: the open violation of the conſtitution is complained of — the baſis of government is ſhaken; and the glorious edifice totters upon its undermined foundations. It is a time for every Engliſhman to feel, rouſe, and exert himſelf: and I am perſuaded this will be the caſe; for, as a great lawyer* of the preſent age juſtly obſerves, "Whenever "the unconſtitutional oppreſſions, even of "the ſovereign power, advance with gi-"gantic ſtrides, and threaten deſolation to "the ſtate, mankind will not be reaſoned "out of the feelings of humanity; nor "will ſacrifice their liberty by a ſcrupulous "adherence to thoſe political maxims, "which were originally eſtabliſhed to pre-"ſerve it."

The cauſes of our alarms are ſerious and important: too ſerious to ſuffer us to

* Judge Blackſtone.

be

be frowned into ſilence by the ſeverity ſhewn to our complaints from the throne; or deterred by the wicked ſneer which abandoned miniſters caſt upon our undoing. And however ſuch treatment and conduct may vindicate the ſevereſt cenſure, yet this is not the effectual way to convince our countrymen of the great evil from whence almoſt every other, of which we juſtly complain, takes its riſe. Pointed ſatire may gratify our reſentment; and we are too apt to reſt ſatisfied with this impotent revenge. The only ſucceſsful way to prevent any future, or cure any preſent evil, is, diſpaſſionately to point out the true cauſes of the corruptions, or miſeries of the ſtate, in order to apply proper remedies to the diſeaſe.

Ever ſince his preſent majeſty's acceſſion to the throne a ſyſtem of policy has been adopted and purſued, by wicked miniſters, which leaves us as much to wonder at, as

lament. No other leading principles appear, but extending prerogative, inſulting the people, and bribing their repreſentatives. The whole progreſſion has been marked with inconſiſtency, folly, and baſeneſs. * One while the privileges of parliament are made ſuperior to the laws of the land: at

* Not only our domeſtic policy has betrayed this, but the whole of our conduct relative to the coloniſts; which, like all other tyranny, was firſt boiſterouſly cruel, and then ſubmiſſively mean — at firſt inconſiſtent with the very ſpirit of government, and the conſtitution; at length, betraying the dignity and honour of both.—But Ireland has felt the rod with unabating ſeverity. Lord Townſend was ſent as the miniſter of vengeance to that poor, oppreſſed, penſion-beggar'd country. His Lordſhip, like a faithful vicegerent, executed his plan; but not knowing when to ſtop, he has at length rouſed the reluctant ſpirit of liberty, and Ireland now is riſen up in noble reſentment. Take but a review of her deplorable ſtate in epitome, and blame her if you can.—The monies paid in penſions for the two laſt years, exceed all the other expences of the real eſtabliſhment by the ſum of *ſeventy-eight thouſand pounds* — and the whole expences of government, for the two laſt years, exceed the income by above *two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds*.

another,

another, voted away in compliment to the throne. To-day, the miniſters are outrageous, and inſulting — to-morrow, timid, and mean. Now they betray our liberties, and ſurrender the honour of the nation, by acts of tyranny and baſeneſs; anon, they reſign their offices and emoluments, though the king is not diſpleaſed, and the people have not virtue enough to call them to account, and puniſh them. Not only the general maxims and principles upon which this free ſtate actually depends, have been diſpenſed with, and utterly abandoned; but the natural connections which the houſe of Hanover formed, when raiſed to the dignity of empire, and which, out of policy, ſhould ever have been maintained, have been unwiſely broken. The friends of the Brunſwick family, and what is ſtill more, the avowed friends of their ſucceſſion, have been ignominiouſly diſmiſſed from places of truſt and

honour,

honour, and thoſe men taken into full confidence, whoſe principles would have led them to have prevented the ſucceſſion, and kept tyranny in the place of freedom. It ſtaggers all political faith, to ſee men ſurrounding the throne of George the Third, admitted to his councils, employed in the firſt offices, and diſtinguiſhed by the higheſt honours of ſtate, who muſt offer a violence to their principles, to ſee, with complacency, the royal diadem upon his head, or receive a benefit from his hand.—But court favour can *bribe*, if not *convert* a Jacobite; and the irreſiſtible grace of George the Third, induce men to transfer to him that perſonal allegiance, which their hearts ſtill deem due to the race of the Stuarts. Such inconſiſtencies as theſe ſeem too great to be accounted for by folly; they point out ſome deep and treacherous *deſigns*; and if we may judge of the intention by the plan, and

thoſe

thoſe employed in the execution of it, the *reſtoration* of the *royal houſe* of *Stuart* may not be wholly out of contemplation. Indeed if the preſent *court* Jacobites can content themſelves with mere principles, regardleſs of the name under whoſe auſpices this favourite plan of deſpotiſm is promoted, they will be eaſy with the preſent ſtate of affairs, and ſacrifice their *jure divino right* to their *places* and *penſions*.

But whatever may be the ſyſtem meant to be eſtabliſhed, we have every reaſon to believe that it is by no means favourable to liberty; becauſe her moſt zealous friends have been diſcarded, and men remarkable for their infamy, and proſtitution, taken into royal favour, and confidence. It is a fair preſumption, that when men of ſuch a caſt and character are employed, that ſomething baſe, or dangerous is to be attempted: Who ever hired an aſſaſſin but for miſchief, or murder?

murder?—What prince would ever admit to his counſels, or his truſt, ſuch men as——but I ſpeak with deference to his majeſty's *wiſdom* and *integrity*; when *ſuch* men are employed, and truſted, it is no doubt with *him* for ſome *very good reaſon*; though the people whom he governs, may be of a very *different* opinion, and think their liberties and the conſtitution in danger. *

When

* The ſymptoms of a declining monarchy pointed out by the ſagacious Monteſquieu, are ſo evidently apparent in our ſtate, that it is impoſſible not to attend to them: which are;

When a prince thinks he ſhews a greater exertion of power in changing, than in conforming to, the order of things; *when he deprives ſome of his ſubjects of their hereditary employments to beſtow them arbitrarily upon others*; and when he is fonder of being guided by fancy than judgment: and further;

When a prince miſtakes his authority, his ſituation, and the love of his people; and when he is not fully perſuaded that a monarch ought to think himſelf ſecure, as a deſpot ought to think himſelf in danger.

The principle of government he ſays is corrupted, when the firſt dignities are marks of the firſt ſervitude; *when*

When *ſuch* men engage in any deſign, for which by their principles and characters they are peculiarly fitted, there is but one method by which their ſervices can be effectually ſecured; and that is, by thoſe rewards which treachery and wickedneſs think their due; in the preſent inſtance, by PLACES and PENSIONS. The evil ſtops not here; court corruption muſt deſcend to every rank of miniſterial conſanguinity—— they muſt be provided for in the firſt, ſecond, and third degree: and well were it for this country, if the royal bounty to *un-*

when the great men are ſtripped of popular reſpect, and rendered the low tools of arbitrary power.

But it is ſtill more corrupted, when honour is ſet up in contradiction to honours, and when men are capable of being loaded at the very ſame time with *infamy* and *dignities*. Or when mean and abject ſouls grow vain of their pompous ſervitude; and think that the ſame motive that induces them to be entirely devoted to the prince, exempts them from all duty to their country.

Spt. of Laws, B. 8, c. 6 & 7.

deſerving miniſters, court ſycophants, and proſtitute ſenators, was confined within the circle of legitimate connection.

The foundation of this evil is the enormous power of the crown to reward ſuch ſtate betrayers with penſionary grants. This, among the various evils of which we complain, is that great, that growing political abuſe, which involves in it ſuch pernicious, and dangerous conſequences; ſuch as the total deſtruction of the equipoiſe of influence and authority that ought ever to ſubſiſt between the legiſlative, and executive powers; and the *ruin* of the Engliſh conſtitution. Under the full perſuaſion that this is really the preſent dangerous ſituation of this nation, I offer, with all decent humility, and the warmeſt zeal, the following conſiderations to my countrymen: happy if they gain their attention equal to the importance

of

of the ſubject. If this ſhould be the caſe, perhaps we may, in time, ſee the evil legally redreſſed, by its being made an object of parliamentary attention.

I am fully perſuaded that this extenſive power of the crown is the ſubject of general complaint; but yet it is regarded only as one of thoſe political evils that have *neceſſarily* ariſen in the ſtate, admitting of no effectual remedy, and therefore patiently to be endured. A dangerous and deſtructive conceſſion: which, however incautiouſly made by well-meaning perſons, is very carefully propagated by the moſt degenerate minds.—I do not ſcruple to affirm, that the preſent actual power of the crown in giving *places*, *penſions*, and *reverſionary grants*, in the *degree* and *manner*, and to the *perſons* in which, and upon whom they are every day laviſhly beſtowed, is not an *inherent*,

original * *right* of the crown, but a manifeſt *abuſe* of part of the royal prerogative — and ſub-

* I take this opportunity of defining preciſely the meaning of *right*, becauſe in general it is taken in ſuch an indefinite ſenſe, that it includes what is manifeſtly deſtructive of itſelf. Right is either *natural*, *acquired*, *political*, or *delegated*. *Natural right* is ſuch a power as a man has over his child —— *Acquired right*, any thing gained by *purchaſe*, *ſurrender*, or *legal transfer*. *Political right*, including the whole rights of governors, and governed, is divided into two branches, that of exacting *due obedience* on the one ſide, and the *right* of enjoying *ſecurity* and *poſſeſſion of property* on the other.—Now this *natural right* of a father over his ſon extends only to his *ſupport*, *protection*, and *direction*. *Acquired right*, if it reſpects only our own poſſeſſion, is reſtricted by the attention which men generally have to themſelves and their affairs. But when it relates to things held in charge or commiſſion for others, as guardians or truſtees, the *right* is to be conſidered under ſtrict limitations. By this *natural right*, a father is not intitled to *ill-treat*, *puniſh unjuſtly*, or *ſeverely*, or *ſlay* his ſon. Guardians and truſtees have no right, by their authority, to *miſguide*, *diſtreſs*, or *defraud* thoſe who are committed to their care: nay, they have received their truſt and authority to *prevent* ſuch *miſguidance*, *diſtreſs*, or *frauds*. The delegated *right* of governors is exactly the ſame; reſtricted either by the nature of the office itſelf, or by expreſs

ſubverſive of the principles of the conſtitution: and that if ſome effectual means be not

expreſs law, as with us, when the king ſolemnly ſwears *to govern according to the laws and cuſtoms of the kingdom.* This *right* only includes ideas of *protection, juſtice*, and the exerciſe of *due authority*. It cannot mean a *right* to *oppreſs, injure*, or *enſlave*. In this ſenſe we may underſtand a maxim of our law, *The king can do no wrong:* i. e. he has not, by virtue of his legal authority, any *right, claim*, or *power* of injuring his ſubjects, or abuſing his own truſt.

Give me leave to apply the doctrine to a particular inſtance. The king has a *right* of nominating to poſts of honour, and places of truſt; which places, as Judge Blackſtone well remarks, *are ſuppoſed to be always held by thoſe that are moſt able to fill them.* When men thus appointed, conſcientiouſly diſcharge the duties of their high office, and gain the reſpect and truſt of their countrymen, the *right thus* exerted, is *conſtitutionally* exerted. But ſuppoſe any great officer of the crown, for inſtance, the Lord Chancellor, ſhould, not for any delinquency or official default, but for a conſcientious conduct, and vote in the Houſe of Peers, be diſmiſſed from his poſt of honour and truſt; would not this imply, according to the preſent principle, an exertion of authority beyond the boundary of *right?* for the caſe ſuppoſes ſuch virtue, integrity and honour in the perſon ſo diſmiſſed, as peculiarly fitted him for the great and important office he ſuſtained. How far Lord Cambden's caſe

not made uſe of to reſtrain this power, and reform its abuſes, it muſt end in the *de-*

caſe comes under this deſcription, I leave to the public to judge.

The *right* of appointment to office, implies an obligation to inveſt thoſe, and thoſe alone, with authority, who will zealouſly and effectually ſerve the public: but when we ſee places diſpoſed of merely to ſtrengthen the court party, and ſupport the miniſter; and great offices confered, not as a reward of merit, but made the means of corruption: when men are diſmiſſed from theſe, on account of that virtue and integrity which fitted them for ſuch rank and duty, who is there that does not complain that the public good is entirely out of view, and the *right* of the crown *abuſed*, when thus *improperly exerted?*

Our conſtitution was at firſt eſtabliſhed upon the pureſt principles —— In the reign of Edward III. when the king aſſumed the great offices of ſtate into his own hands, all the judges were expreſsly excepted; who were then by act of parliament, and their oaths, required to proceed according to law, notwithſtanding the king's command or ſeal. And the regiſter affords a writ to ſupercede or revoke any ſuch ſeal from the king to any of the judges. And,

In the reign of Henry III. the Lord Keeper Nevil abſolutely refuſed to reſign the great ſeal, though commanded by the king ſo to do.

ſtruction

ſtruction of liberty, and the *eſtabliſhment of deſpotiſm.*

In order fully to prove this aſſertion, I ſhall premiſe ſome important arguments deduced from the nature of government in general, and applicable, in a particular manner, to this, and every other free ſtate.

When men enter into ſociety, there is certainly a reſignation of many things, which, in a ſtate of nature, each is entitled to enjoy: ſuch as the power of making laws, to which all are bound to pay due obedience, as well as a portion of that wealth which is procured by perſonal induſtry, for the ſupport of the exigencies, and for the defence of the ſtate. The very foundation of ſuch voluntary ſurrender of power, and fortune immediately points out the duty of the magiſtrate, into whoſe hands the people have committed the adminiſtration of public affairs;

fairs; and evidently ſhews, by the peculiar uſe, and aſſiſtance to which ſuch things ſhould be appropriated, what are the abuſes of the power and truſt. While the ſupreme magiſtrate manages the public treaſures with fidelity and œconomy, to defray the neceſſary expences of government, either in peace or war; for the encouragement of arts and commerce; and ſometimes, to reward thoſe who have rendered the ſtate ſignal ſervices; he applies the public treaſure to a proper uſe, and has diſcharged his duty. But if, inſtead of this, he ſhould convert the wealth of the people to the aggrandizing and enriching himſelf; or to ſatisfy indigent creatures of his own; or for the ſupport of ambition, luxury and pride; this is a manifeſt breach of his truſt, and violation of his duty: it is at once a forfeiture of all claims to confidence; and deſtroys, as far as it can, the

political

political compact, which is either tacitly allowed, or ſpecifically exiſting, in every form of government. Now the *abuſe* of a power is an abſolute *renunciation* of it: and to ſay that a power exiſts after ſuch a violation of it as here ſuppoſed, is to deſtroy all foundation of reciprocal duties, the obligations to which reſult from the mutual diſcharge of them. When the end is defeated for which I have made a voluntary ſurrender of any thing, the right of reſumption immediately takes place, and reverts without any formal claim: conſequently the *continued exertion* of that power, by the perſon who has thus *abuſed* it, is an arbitrary infringement both upon my *liberty* and *property*.

Can it be ſuppoſed, that mankind would ever have voluntarily reſigned any thing into the hands of governors, without ſome equivalent advantage either of protection

or ſecurity? Every political maxim of ſtate goes upon one grand principle, and one alone, *viz.* the PUBLIC GOOD. And whenever governors convert either power, or riches, into the ſcourge of tyranny or oppreſſion, the end is defeated for which government was alone originally inſtituted: and when this is the caſe, the government ceaſes to be *legal*, * and is, *eo inſtanti*, a TYRANNY.

Theſe arguments reſult from the ſtate of things; they are founded in the policy

* The people's rights, as Lord Bacon obſerves, are under the protection of *public law*; for laws are for the people; magiſtrates for laws; and the *authority of magiſtrates* depends upon the *majeſty* of empire, and the form of policy; and upon *laws fundamental*: wherefore, if this part be ſound and healthful, laws will be to good purpoſe; if otherwiſe, there will be little ſecurity in them. *Lord Bacon's Aph.* 3d.

And again; The end and aim at which the laws ſhould level, and whereto they ſhould direct their decrees and ſanctions, is no other than this, *That the people may live happily.* *Ibid.* 5th.

of

of human nature; and therefore they are a ſolid ground for the following reflections.

I am very ready to grant, that for wiſe and good ends, the wiſdom of our conſtitution has, among many other prerogatives, veſted in the crown the beſtowal of grants, and places of honour and emolument. By this the regal dignity is ſupported; and the compact influence and weight of the crown made a proper political balance againſt the diffuſive power of Lords and Commons. But the *end* for which ſuch a prerogative was originally granted, muſt be effectually *deſtroyed*, if ever the weight of the crown becomes preponderant. This power muſt therefore neceſſarily have been given under ſome regulations and reſtrictions, either ſpecified or implied: for were it *unlimited* in its *nature* and *grant*, or the crown *unaccountable* in its *application* and *uſe*, the poverty and ſlavery of the ſubject would ſoon

prove, by the moſt dreadful conſequences, the folly of ſuch an unlimited commiſſion of power.

I am ſenſible, that in general, every prerogative of the crown carries with it ſuch an extenve idea of *right*, that we are apt to confound the abuſes with the real power, from whoſe *miſapplication* theſe abuſes proceed. But let us remember, that the king's prerogative is not, in any inſtance whatever, *infinita, aut libera poteſtas*; it is limited, and defined: "It is not," as Judge Blackſtone well remarks, "as in former times, among "the *arcana imperii*, or like the myſteries "of the *Bona Dea*, ſuffered to be pry'd "into by any but ſuch as are initiated into "its ſervice." *It is law*, as Bracton ſays, *that maketh the king*—and his prerogative is juſtly defined by L. C. Finch, *not being able to do any injury to the ſubject, but all manner of good.*—Thus wiſely did our forefathers

fathers circumſcribe prerogative by law; and when we conſider that nearly ten millions annually are under the management of officers appointed by the crown, the power of diſpoſal ought to be under ſome very ſtrict regulations.

Accordingly we find that the wiſdom of our conſtitution has reſtricted the crown; and, upon tranſgreſſion of its authority, diſannulled its acts; * and circumſcribed the legiſlative part in their acceptance of favours from it.

The law expreſsly declares the following perſons incapable of being choſen members to ſerve in parliament. All perſons concerned in the management of any duties, or taxes, created ſince 1692, except the com-

* In the reign of Henry IV. letters patent were iſſued for eſtabliſhing a new office for meaſuring cloths, demanding a *new fee* for the ſame; on which account the parliament revoked the letters patent, and declared them null and void.

miſſioners

miſſioners of the Treaſury, or any of the officers following, *viz.* commiſſioners of prizes, tranſports, ſick and wounded, wine-licences, navy and victualling; ſecretaries or receivers of prizes; comptrollers of the army accounts; agents for regiments; governors of plantations, and their deputies; officers of Minorca or Gibraltar; officers of the exciſe and cuſtoms; clerks or deputies in the ſeveral offices of the Treaſury, Exchequer, navy, victualling, and Admiralty; pay of the army or navy; ſecretaries of ſtate, ſalt, ſtamps, appeals, wine-licences, hackney coaches, hawkers and pedlars, or any perſons that hold any new office under the crown, created ſince 1705. And further; all perſons having a penſion under the crown during pleaſure, or for any term of years, are incapable of being elected. And if any member accepts an office under the crown, except an officer in the army or navy accepting

cepting a new commiſſion, his ſeat is void; but they may be re-elected.

Theſe legal incapacities were evidently very wiſely deſigned to keep the repreſentatives independent, and to preſerve a pure uncorrupt houſe of the people. I need not ſay how ſuch diſqualifications are diſpenſed with, or evaded each day. Every department of ſtate is filled with members of parliament, and their dependents; and many places in the revenue itſelf with nominal patentees, who pay the profits into the hands of the corrupt, perjured ſenator.—What a pernicious ſyſtem muſt it be to engage a man to give a vote in the ſenate, by a reward which legally diſqualifies him from voting, or ſitting there at all?—And what confidence can the people have in their repreſentatives, when the majority have a pretended right of ſuffrage, purchaſed at the

expence

expence of every principle, both religious and political?

Now it evidently appears, from the foregoing reaſoning, that, if by *any means* the crown can beſtow places and penſions upon *thoſe* that the laws have deemed *incapable* of receiving them, and the penalties are evaded which attend ſuch acceptance, that there is an *abuſe* of the *power*, and a *violation* of the *conſtitution*. And however ſuch abuſes in the ſtate may be countenanced by the corrupt practice of theſe degenerate times, I am ſure the *ſpirit*, and *letter* of the *conſtitution* and *laws* expreſsly *contradict* them.—It is a part of the king's prerogative, as the ſource of all honours and dignity, to create, by patent, peers of the realm: but ſuppoſe, that on any ſudden emergency, as once was the caſe, that an unuſual number of peers were ſuddenly created (I mean not the late

fooliſh

fooliſh promotions in Ireland) would any one ſcruple to affirm, that ſuch a ſtep was highly reprehenſible; that it was an improper exertion of power, and ſuch an abuſe as comes within the ſcope of our preſent argument?

All power is *limited* either by the *nature* of the *authority* itſelf, or the *character* of him who ſuſtains it; and when once it is *tranſgreſſed*, its *legal* operation ceaſes. What is tyranny, but delegated power miſapplied, or the exertion of authority never beſtowed?——

The whole of the previous argument is ſubſtantiated by the political principles of our own conſtitution, and adopted maxims of ſtate. I will therefore conſider theſe arguments as one and the ſame, and reaſon from them as from our laws, and conſtitution.

Before I proceed, I ſhall ſtate and anſwer an objection which I have often heard made to the preſent doctrine; which is, "*That if the power of the crown be thus reſtricted by law, while the prerogative remains of granting penſions, and advancing to poſts of honour and emolument, and the ſupplies by which the crown is enabled to do this, are annually voted by the parliament; what foundation is there for thoſe complaints of the enormous influence and power of it?*

To this I anſwer, there are two evident ways by which this power of the crown, in the grant of penſions and places, may be *perniciouſly exerciſed*, or *wholly abuſed*; which conſequently brings it within the ſcope of the foregoing argument.—The firſt is, when places of honour and emolument are beſtowed upon men who have not *deſerved* well of the ſtate, court favourites, or mere tools of the crown; the ſecond, when the repreſenta-

tives

tives of the people are corrupted or biaſſed by ſuch gifts.——Honours and emoluments are, ſtrictly and politically ſpeaking, the juſt rewards of heroic actions in the field, or wiſe counſels in the cabinet—to crown the head of virtue, or the brow of valour—to enrich or ennoble ſuch men as are willing to reſign all for their country; and who themſelves ſeek no other reward than the approving teſtimony of their own breaſt that they *deſerve* the higheſt.——By this means the prince is made the inſtrument of the people's bounty and favour. Public virtue is rewarded by public honours: and the important recommendation of virtuous and heroic deeds comes enforced from the moſt influential authority, when we ſee the crown reward, with diſtinguiſhed honours and favour, the able ſtateſman, the accompliſhed orator, or the gallant ſoldier. When the royal favour beams upon ſuch men as theſe, it is reflected back upon the prince himſelf;

illuſtrates his own dignity, and irradiates even his crown. The people will not mourn a deficency in the civil liſt to honour the warrant of royal bounty, when thus rewarding wiſdom and merit.

But when the public treaſures are exhauſted to ſatisfy the craving avarice of ſome abandoned tool of power—when the luxury of the prince, or ſome ſtate prodigal, is to be ſupported—when the extravagance or loſſes of a gambling peer are to be repaired from the public coffers, and the nation loaded with accumulated debts to enable the crown to reward, or rather *further corrupt* ſuch men, with other baſe dependents, or proſtitute ſenators; the people have a right to complain of the *abuſe*, if not the *enormous power* of the crown. *

And

* It is the duty of princes to adjuſt the public burthens according to the public exigencies, ſo that they may *lawfully* provide for their own ſupport, in a way ſuitable

And indeed this very *abuſe* it is, that at length makes the power oppreſſively great—the progreſſion is eaſy and natural. When men, by their avarice or prodigality, have loſt all ſenſe of honour and principle, they are fit objects of corruption. If, among the repreſentatives of the people, a majority can be found, upon whom penſions and places can ſo powerfully work that they will join the court in any corrupt meaſure, and ſupport the miniſter in any deſign, however repugnant to the public good, the whole of government is at an end †—the crown has

ſuitable to their rank; but not to make the luxury and luſt of themſelves, and their court-ſlaves, the meaſure of what they demand, which indeed hath no meaſure.

Grotius.

† By the operation of this extenſive influence of the crown, I look upon the legiſlative and executive power as melted into one: and Baron Secondat remarks, "That when this is the caſe, *there can be no liberty*; "becauſe apprehenſions may ariſe, leſt the ſame mo- "narch and ſenate ſhould enact tyrannical laws, to "execute them in a tyrannical manner."

Spt. of Laws, B. 11. ch. 6.

all

all in its own power—there is no balance againſt it in the political ſcale——it is left without reſtriction or reſtraint, to laviſh the public monies to every worthleſs wretch whom it deems important enough to *bribe* or *corrupt*. If, by ſuch abuſes, an additional debt be incurred, eaſy is it for the miniſter, with ſuch venal ſlaves in the houſe, to prevent all enquiry into the debt, or the expenditure that occaſioned it.

This was actually the caſe in a late ſeſſions of parliament, when a deficiency of the civil liſt amounted to the enormous ſum of 500,000 *l.* and the motion made for an enquiry into the expenditure was over-ruled—the repreſentatives of the people refuſing to give them that conſtitutional ſatisfaction upon the appropriation of monies, raiſed upon them by oppreſſive taxes, which they have

have a *right* to *demand.** Thus, half a million of money was *privately*, and *diſhonourably* diſpoſed of, without the people's knowledge or conſent; and yet the meaſure ſanctified by a vote of their repreſentatives.—It is not ſufficient, in this caſe, to

* It is really ſurprizing to mark at one time the folly, at another the inſolence of miniſters. While they were pretending the moſt rigid œconomy in the domeſtic management of the king's houſhold, they were laviſhing away the public monies in the utmoſt profuſion, in corrupting the people and repreſentatives; and while a deſpicable parſimony, that would have diſgraced a private gentleman, was obſerved in the royal kitchen, monies were ſquandered, that would, if properly managed, have defrayed the king's private expences. Can they think that ſuch inſolent deluſions can long be paſſed upon the people? Can they ſuppoſe, that ſuch comprehenſive wickedneſs, and violation of the people's ſacred rights, can go unpuniſhed?

Cur tamen hos tu
Evaſiſſe putes, quos diri conſcia facti
Mens habet attonitos, et ſurdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum?
Pœna autem vehemens, ac multo ſævior illis,
Quas aut Ceditius, gravis invenit, aut Rhadamanthus,
Nocte dieque ſuum geſtare in pectore teſtem.

Juv. Sat. 13.

ſay,

ſay, that whatever is done by our repreſentatives is done by ourſelves, becauſe we have delegated to them a power, and authority of acting for us.—Repreſentatives may betray their truſt, and violate their duty, and tranſgreſs the law. All that the people have, or indeed *can* reſign to them, is, the power of making *ſalutary* laws, and preſerving their liberties, and the conſtitution. They have not, they *cannot* give them any *right* to *pervert* or *tranſgreſs* the laws, or government.

Suppoſe the parliament were to paſs a vote that enabled the king to levy money upon the people, by any ways or means that the law has deemed improper, or injurious; would ſuch a reſolution have the force, or authority of the law? No: the *great tranſcendent law* * of this ſtate, let Lord Mans-

* What the Roman orator ſays of another law, is equally applicable to this: Eſt igitur JUDICES, hæc non ſcripta,

Mansfield ſay what he will, is LIBERTY: whenever that is tranſgreſſed, whether by King, Lords, or Commons, they have betrayed their truſt, diſqualified themſelves, violated the conſtitution, abuſed the people, and conſequently diſſolved the compact.

With reſpect to the preſent argument, the *actual operation* and *effects* of ſuch *abuſes*, there is very little difference, whether ſuch pernicious maxims paſs into a *law*, or whether this deſtructive power of the crown, under pretence of *prerogative*, be *permitted* to operate, and extend itſelf, under the ſanction and allowance of parliament, to the demolition of all virtue in our repreſenta-

ſcripta, ſed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex naturâ ipſâ arripuimus, hauſimus, expreſſimus: ad quam non docti, ſed facti; non inſtituti, ſed imbuti ſumus.

Cic. pro Milone.

tives, and all liberty with ourſelves. The only difference in the caſe is *preſcription*, and *law*; and when once the laws and conſtitution have been ſo far broken and violated, that *preſcription* can be *pleaded*, tyranny will want nothing but the act to eſtabliſh its horrid claims. And this ſtretch of part of the prerogative, is one great ſtride towards it: for, as the learned commentator before quoted well obſerves, "The enormous weight of prerogative, if left to itſelf, (as in arbitrary government it is) ſpreads havock and deſtruction among all the inferior movements."

Theſe evils of which we complain, are the natural conſequences of a corrupt ſtate, and a pernicious ſyſtem of politics: a ſyſtem, in part, *once* tolerated from ſuppoſed neceſſity. After the revolution, "when a different ſyſtem of politics was introduced, freſh

freſh expences incurred, a new eſtabliſhment made, and long wars maintained for ſecuring the Dutch barrier, reducing the French monarchy, ſettling the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, ſupporting the houſe of Auſtria, maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body, the national expences were amazingly increaſed. The taxes neceſſary to defray ſuch expences could not be levied in one year; the revenues were anticipated — large ſums were borrowed for the current ſervice—the intereſt of the debt was paid, while the debt itſelf was converted into a new ſpecies of property." This was the foundation of that pernicious ſyſtem of funding the national debt; the ſource of more evils, than we can enumerate here—and the certain principle that every day operates towards our deſtruction. — What a debt do we labour under, when five millions are ſcarcely ſufficient to defray the annual intereſt, and charges

for management? — Upon the acceſſion of George the Firſt, it ſeemed neceſſary to ſtrengthen the authority of the man by adding luſtre and power to the prince.— The purchaſe of temporary reſpect, was attempted by temporary corruption—The experiment, at any hazard, was dangerous: to make it was to eſtabliſh it.—Governors cannot bear an abridgment of power: that of honours and emolument leaſt of all.— Miniſters conſpire with the prince; and finding their own authority and power ſupported by his, join in the wicked * plan of oppreſſion. Inſtead therefore of curtailing, miniſters have been for enlarging the power

* Μισεῖ γαρ ὁ Θεὸς την βίαν, &c.

God hates the violent, commanding all
To live on what their honeſt pains procure;
And not to feed their wants with mutual ſpoils.
Oppreſſors ſhould be baniſh'd human race,
Unworthy of the name.

Eurip. in Helen.

of

of the crown; and have erected into a ſyſtem, what was at firſt deſigned, by well-meaning men, as a temporary ſupport, (juſtified by the neceſſity of the caſe) of a family upon the throne, from whom they expected advantages and bleſſings more than equivalent to any riſque they ran, or any expences they could incur in the ſupport of it.*

* A remark of the ingenious Monteſquieu on the abuſe of liberty, ſtrikes me ſo forcibly, as exactly deſcribing the hiſtorical policy of the Brunſwick family, that I muſt recite it, whatever offence it may give at court.

"To the great advantages of liberty is owing that "liberty itſelf has been abuſed. Becauſe a moderate "government has been productive of admirable ef-"fects, this moderation has been laid aſide: becauſe "great taxes have been raiſed, they want to raiſe "them to exceſs: and, ungrateful to the hand of "liberty of whom they received this preſent, they "addreſs themſelves to ſlavery, who never grants the "leaſt favour."

Spt. of Laws, B. 13. Ch. 15.

In

In conſequence of ſuch a ſyſtem being eſtabliſhed, we find the power and influence of the crown ſo predominant, that we have very good reaſons to fear our ruin will proceed from the abuſes of that authority which was ſo *peculiarly* veſted for our ſecurity, and the ſupport of our liberties. "For," (to uſe the words of the learned commentator on the laws of England) "our national debt and "taxes (beſides other inconveniencies) have "in their natural conſequences thrown ſuch "a weight of power into the executive ſcale "of government, as we cannot think was "intended by our patriot anceſtors, who "glorioufly ſtruggled for the abolition of "the then formidable parts of the prerogative; and, by an unaccountable want of "foreſight, eſtabliſhed this ſyſtem in their "ſtead.

"The entire collection and management "of our vaſt revenue" (as the ſame ingenious author

author remarks) " being placed in the hands " of the crown, have given riſe to ſuch a " multitude of new officers, created by, and " removeable at the royal pleaſure, that they " have extended the influence of government " to every corner of the nation. Witneſs " the commiſſioners, and the multitude of " dependents on the cuſtoms, in every port " of the kingdom; the commiſſioners of ex- " ciſe, and their numerous ſubalterns, in " every inland diſtrict; the poſtmaſters, and " their ſervants, planted in every town, and " upon every public road; the commiſſioners " of the ſtamps, and their diſtributors, " which are full as ſcattered, and full as " numerous; the officers of the ſalt duty, " which, though a ſpecies of exciſe, and " conducted in the ſame manner, are yet " made a diſtinct corps from the ordinary " managers of that revenue; the ſurveyors " of houſes and windows; the receivers of

" the

" the land-tax; the managers of lotteries;
" and the commiſſioners of hackney coaches;
" all which are either mediately or imme-
" diately appointed by the crown, and re-
" moveable at pleaſure: theſe, it requires
" but little penetration to ſee, muſt give
" that power, on which they depend for
" ſubſiſtence, an influence moſt amazingly
" extenſive. To this may be added the
" frequent opportunities of conferring par-
" ticular obligations, by preference in loans,
" ſubſcriptions, tickets, remittances, and
" other money tranſactions, which will greatly
" increaſe this influence; and that over thoſe
" perſons, whoſe attachment, on account
" of their wealth, is frequently moſt de-
" ſirable. All this is the natural, though
" perhaps the unforeſeen, conſequence of
" erecting our funds of credit; and to ſup-
" port them, eſtabliſhing our preſent per-
" petual taxes: the whole of which is en-
" tirely

" tirely new ſince the reſtoration in 1660;
" and by far the greateſt part ſince the re-
" volution in 1688. And the ſame may
" be ſaid with regard to the officers in our
" numerous army, and the places which the
" army has created. All which put together
" gives the executive power ſo perſuaſive an
" energy, with reſpect to the perſons them-
" ſelves, and ſo prevailing an intereſt with
" their friends and families, as will amply
" make amends for the loſs of external pre-
" rogative.

" But though this profuſion of offices
" ſhould have no effect on individuals, there
" is ſtill another newly acquired branch of
" power; and that is, not the influence
" only, but the force of a diſciplined army;
" paid indeed ultimately by the people, but
" immediately by the crown; raiſed by the
" crown, officered by the crown, com-

" manded by the crown, and at the abſo-
" lute diſpoſal of the crown."*

From ſuch a recital it plainly appears how very extenſively the power and influence of the crown muſt operate. Add to this the appointment to all offices of truſt about the court; with the power of giving penſions, and reverſionary grants; and the whole catalogue of places which makes ſo large a part of our annual regiſter; and this allowed

* Add to this the office of ordnance — a department of extenſive weight and influence; in which court dependants, and venal ſenators find proviſion for themſelves and friends. Nor are there greater abuſes in any one department of ſtate than are here to be found, worſe than *tolerated* by one of the firſt officers himſelf; who, among other abuſes, ſuch as ſupporting his own pride and luxury at the expence of the public, has, with an audacious inſolence, a military guard, in regular order, to defend his territories in the country, which he has erected into a kind of ſovereign dominion, by arbitrary and cruel incloſures, that preclude the indigent poor from reaping thoſe advantages which humanity and Engliſh courteſy have given them a preſcriptive right to enjoy.

power

power and influence of the crown, without any *ſtretch*, or *abuſe*, will appear ſo formidable, that had we not *abuſes* to complain of, we muſt complain of the power and influence *themſelves*. We ceaſe to wonder that our parliament is venal and corrupt, when it is in the power of the crown to reward with penſions and places, not only a majority of the Houſe of Commons, but almoſt a majority of the people.

The exiſtence of this power has been the temptation to wicked miniſters to plan and eſtabliſh their deſtructive ſyſtem of adminiſtration.* The Stuarts, who though fond of

* In order to judge for what *ends* the higheſt offices of ſtate, the largeſt penſions, and moſt ſingular rewards are beſtowed, we have only to conſider on what men the royal bounty moſt peculiarly ſhines.

How muſt we ſmile, did not ruin attend the thought, when we are told of the exemplary virtue of the *beſt of kings*, and ſee ſuch men as the malignant, revengeful Grafton, the profligate Sandwich, the Jacobite De

of prerogative, and ſacrificing all to it, did not enjoy half the power now exerciſed by the

Spencer, the ſpendthrift Denbigh, the courtly Pomfret, and the bloody Barrington, in full confidence with the king, or enjoying the firſt honours of the ſtate? Nor let us forget thoſe *zealous friends of the people*, Sir Fletcher Norton, raiſed to the chair of the ſenate, and making a vote of parliament paramount to the law of the land, after the rude and inſolent declaration, *that he regarded the reſolutions of that houſe no more than the reſolution of drunken porters*; with that pattern of conſummate virtue, Jeremiah Dyſon, Eſq; with modeſt Rigby, and the gentle Bradſhaw, whoſe face can be ſquar'd to every miniſter's humour; and Charles Jenkinſon, Eſq; the lackeying ſlave of the Carlton-houſe junto—&c. &c. &c. Ruin is in the names and characters of theſe men; and the pitiable ſituation of our *wiſe* monarch (conſidering under what influence he acts, and upon what principles he proceeds) conſpires to the efficacy of ſuch men's vices: for, as Lord Bacon well remarks, "When *a* "*prince* is of ſuch a temper as *to lend an eaſy and* "*credulous ear, without due examination, to diſtractors,* "*and ſycophants*, there breathes a peſtilential air from "the king's ſide, which *corrupts, and infects all his* "*ſervants.*"

Nothing more ſtrongly marks the declining ſtate of any government, than the manner in which places are diſpoſed of, and the characters of thoſe who fill them.

When

the crown, could not, and therefore alone did not, make the experiment of ſeducing and bribing the repreſentatives of the people; this was to be ſucceſsfully done in the *auſpi-*

When Lord Chatham was diſmiſſed from his poſt of honours, which he ſuſtained with equal glory to himſelf, and the nation, it was an omen that preſaged ruin to this nation. But when ſucceeded by Lord Bute, we ſaw our deſtruction ſure. Ever ſince that memorable day, we ſee what men have been preferred, and how honours have been diſpoſed of. The great ſeal was torn from the hands of one of the ableſt men that ever held it; and another of high rank, and eminent for his great abilities, thought a voluntary death preferable to the higheſt office in the nation. While the ſeals were in commiſſion, nothing was done with credit to their authority, or ſatisfactory to the people. The Earl of Chatham's tryal and appeal will ever be remembered as an inſtance of the *conſummate abilities* of the *commiſſioners*, and *Lord Mansfield's integrity and virtue.*

How the duties of that great office, the keeper of the king's *conſcience*, are *now* diſcharged, I will not pretend to ſay; but if I am not miſinformed by the Juriſperiti, it is one while with ſuch *preciſion*, at another with ſuch *latitude*, as ſuits very well with the *truſt* committted to that great officer's charge.

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro talibus auſis
Præmia poſſe reor ſolvi?

cious

cious reigns of the houſe of Hanover; and receive its conſummation under the *beſt of princes*, GEORGE THE THIRD.

Fearful of the people, and in awe of the virtue of their repreſentatives, the Stuarts attempted to reign without parliaments. They thought the only way of eſtabliſhing deſpotiſm was to erect it upon the ruins of the great bulwark of the ſtate. The treaſonable deſign was defeated by the vigilance and virtue of the patriots of that time, whoſe conduct ſhould animate and inſpire us; and the more ſo, becauſe the failure in this attempt has been a warning to ſucceeding princes not to make the ſame experiment. The mode of attack upon our liberties is changed; parliaments are now deemed neceſſary to the great work of deſtruction. We are to be enſlaved, but enſlaved oſtenſibly by ourſelves, i. e. by our repreſentatives. Thus the crown appears clear of the guilt,

guilt, or but *half* a ſharer in it; and the people ſeem to be authors of their own ruin.

Such a confederacy is ſufficient to alarm us—it juſtifies our reſentment; and leaves us nothing to hope from thoſe, to whom we have entruſted the conſervation of our ſacred liberties.—When we find our guardians betraying us, we ought to protect ourſelves, by having recourſe, as the learned judge before quoted ſays, "to thoſe firſt principles "which are neceſſary when the contracts "of ſociety are in danger of diſſolution, and "the laws prove too weak a defence againſt "the violence of fraud or oppreſſion." Our governors, it is to be feared, will impoſe this neceſſity upon us. They themſelves are authors of thoſe complaints with which we have *wounded* the ear of our *gracious* ſovereign.—The treaſonable attempts *

of

* Our antient conſtitution ſpake the ſame language, and advanced the ſame doctrine, applying it to caſes greatly

of wicked miniſters juſtify every oppoſition —and when but *one* way is left to reſcue our liberties, and free ourſelves, whatever it be, it is ſanctified by the *cauſe* of our inju-

greatly inferior to that violation here ſuppoſed.—It taught, that when any conſiderable injury was offered by one ſubject to another, that the offender was guilty, and accordingly he was accuſed, of perjury, having violated the king's coronation oath. And even now, in criminal proceedings, offences are ſaid to be committed againſt the king, his crown and dignity; becauſe, as the public peace and happineſs is ſuppoſed to be diſturbed and violated, by every injury of this ſort, and the king is the firſt magiſtrate to whom the people have entruſted the conſervation of the peace and tranquility of the nation, and inveſted him with authority and dignity, every offence is ſaid to be againſt *his* peace, crown, or authority, and dignity. If this be the caſe with leſs offenders, what ſhall we ſay to the great ſtate criminals, who laviſh our monies without any account—violate the conſtitution—and even *counſel* the king himſelf to break his ſacred oath, and his people's peace; by that means making him the betrayer of his own dignity! — If this be not treaſon againſt the ſtate, of the firſt magnitude, I am wholly miſtaken. Such men may juſtly be ſaid *ſacramentum domini regis fregiſſe*; which was laid in the charge againſt Chief Juſtice Thorpe, when he was condemned to be hanged for bribery.

Rot. Parl. 25 Edw. III.

ries,

ries, and the generous end, and manly deſign of reſenting them.

I am ſurpriſed at the language that ſome men hold, who pretend to ſay, *that we cannot juſtly complain of the venality and corruption of our preſent repreſentatives, when we ourſelves, by this very means, return them to parliament.* — This is an invincible reaſon why ſome effectual method ſhould be taken to rectify theſe abuſes, and prevent the ruinous effects of both theſe pernicious evils. If the power of the crown was more limited, or reſtrained, our repreſentatives would not bribe the people to return them to parliament. The corrupt candidate knows, that the miniſter, by the aſſiſtance of the Treaſury, can reward his proſtitute vote with ſome ſettled place, penſion, or annual allowance, more than equivalent to the expences of purchaſing his ſeat by the corruption of his conſtituents. In fact, he con-

ſiders the matter as it actually is; *viz.* that the people are bribed with their own money: for if the repreſentative be reimburſed in his expences by the Treaſury, which muſt be ſupplied by *taxes* raiſed by the ſubject, the people are, to all intents and purpoſes, the perſons who furniſh the money with which they themſelves are bribed.—*Let them ſeriouſly conſider this.*

But if this venality of the people is the cauſe of the corruption by their repreſentatives, in the name of common ſenſe, and policy, make a law to prevent both. Is not *neceſſity*, real or imaginary, the foundation of all law?—Were mankind to live righteouſly, ſoberly, and godly, they would need no honours to reward, no puniſhments to deter, or reſtrain them. A legal reformation of ſuch illegal abuſes, and evils, is the very point at which we aim: it is the ſum, ſubſtance, and concluſion of the whole.

Let

Let us now conſider more particularly the deſtructive conſequences that muſt neceſſarily flow from this enormous power of the crown, and the abuſes of it.

It directly tends to introduce ſlavery, by eſtabliſhing arbitrary power. It deſtroys the rights of the people, by giving an opportunity to the king's miniſters to corrupt their repreſentatives: conſequently, under pretence of law, tyranny may be eſtabliſhed, and the nation ruined. When the evil flows from ſo exalted a ſource, * no wonder that it carries along with it its baneful influences, which muſt ſoon reach and corrupt every inferior part of the ſtate. When the people find their governors reſigning their dignity and conſcience for places and penſions,

* There is a Perſian proverb, whoſe aptneſs and good ſenſe ſtrike me in connection with the preſent ſubject, which ſays, If a king gather an apple in a ſubject's garden, his ſervants will root up the tree.

they eaſily, from ſuch precedents, draw excuſes in extenuation of their own guilt, when they ſell themſelves. Thus the principles and morals of the people are debauched by the higheſt examples; and all thoſe vices nouriſhed which lay the foundation of this venality and corruption. *

When the virtuous patriot few, ſee freedom languiſhing under ſuch oppreſſive weight, and the peremptory vote of the houſe oppoſed to ſound argument and reaſon, and eloquence of no avail; they will naturally grow remiſs in theſe important parts of ſenatorial duty; conſidering an abſolute proteſt againſt any proceeding ſufficient, when

* To what an height of inſolent wickedneſs muſt any man arrive, who has in truſt the liberties of his country, who can ſedately declare, in a public coffee-room, *that he had bought his conſtituents, and he was determined to ſell them!*—I appeal to a large circle at the Mount, if a certain member of a borough in the weſt, did not make this open declaration.—*Quædam cauſæ modeſtiam deſiderant.*

they

they find conſtitutional pleadings nugatory, or vain. The freedom of debate, the vital ſpirit of liberty, will, by this means, be overruled, and controuled: and after a little mock ſhew, the miniſter, or one of his creatures, will call for the queſtion, and ſtop all fair debate upon it. Whoever has attended the houſes of parliament of late years, eſpecially the two laſt ſeſſions, will find this to be notoriouſly the caſe. A remarkable inſtance cannot eſcape us: when *Mr. Sawbridge* made one of the moſt important motions that ever can come under debate, *viz.* a motion for ſhortening the duration of parliaments, and very ſtrong and convincing arguments were urged in favour of it; the miniſtry ſat in contemptuous ſilence, and anſwered theſe arguments by calling the queſtion. When once this is the caſe, Engliſhmen! where are your liberties?

When

When ſuch proceedings are going forward in the houſes of parliament, it is no wonder that they ſhould exclude the people from hearing their debates. Their fears were authors of the reſolution. Were our repreſentatives conſcious that nothing but our intereſts and liberties were in contemplation, ſo far from being unwilling that the people ſhould hear their debates, they would voluntarily throw open the doors, when in ſolemn council. Inſtead of ſuch a fair open appeal to us, they ſhut themſelves in cloſe retirement, like ſolemn inquiſitors, brooding over their own miſchief, till it ripens into ſome dreadful deſign againſt our liberties, and the conſtitution. Is not the obſervation of Tacitus, concerning the Roman ſtate, applicable to our own? — *Antehac flagitiis laboraſſe, nunc legibus.*

When the freedom of debate is thus effectually deſtroyed, and gentlemen conſider that

that arguments, however juſt and forcible in themſelves, ſerve but to mark the ſpeaker as an object of miniſterial vengeance; leſs care will be taken to ſtudy the conſtitution, or furniſh themſelves with the beſt arguments in defence of it when violated. By this means the people will loſe their conſtitutional advocates:—when their liberties are infringed, they will be treated with inſult and contempt;—their injuries laughed at by thoſe who dare offer them affronts;—and their grievances remain unredreſſed, to the full gratification of any law-leſs miniſter, or ſtate uſurper.—I appeal to my countrymen, if ſome, tho' not all of theſe conſequences have not been felt by us. The people have been inſulted, and called *the ſcum of the earth*, and other opprobrious names, in open ſenate; the great law of parliament in the free election of repreſentatives, audaciouſly violated, and the meaſure authoritatively eſpouſed:

eſpouſed: the *conſtitutional* remonſtrances of the people treated with contempt; and the *right* of petitioning the king, virtually denied from the throne itſelf.—The reigns of the deteſtable Stuarts furniſh not out ſuch a miniſterial ſpeech: and nothing but the *confidence* of the *beſt* of kings could have induced him to deliver it to his people. But he was *willing* to think his *good miniſters* right, and his *complaining* ſubjects wrong.—In the king it was an error of *judgment*; — in the miniſter, TREASON.*

When

* I cannot help reminding my countrymen of this miniſterial inſult; which I do by reciting his majeſty's *moſt gracious* anſwer to their *conſtitutional* complaints and petition. I hope the city of London, eſpecially that part of it who choſe Mr. Naſh Lord Mayor, will forgive me.—Every body remembers the petition; but we ſeem all to have forgotten the anſwer: I here give it, with ſome proper remarks that ſoon after appeared in the public papers.—

"I ſhall ever be ready to exert my prerogative, as far "as I can conſtitutionally, in redreſſing any real "grievances of my ſubjects; and the city of London "will

When the public monies are thus laviſhed—the Treaſury exhauſted by debts incurred

" will always find me diſpoſed to liſten to any of their
" well-founded complaints. It is therefore with con-
" cern that I ſee a part of my ſubjects ſtill ſo far miſ-
" led and deluded, as to renew, in ſuch reprehenſible
" terms, a requeſt, with which I have repeatedly de-
" clared I cannot comply."

The following are the remarks which appeared ſoon afterwards in the public papers.

To the KING,

SIR,

Were not the love of your ſubjects ſo ſettled upon their ſovereign, that nothing can leſſen it, the conduct of your miniſters muſt, by the repeated affronts they offer to the people, excite their indignation and higheſt reſentment. Inſpired by the impunity with which their atrocious crimes go unpuniſhed; encouraged by that countenance which your Majeſty, in your well known clemency, and princely moderation, gives to men of merit and deſert; they venture boldly on, uninfluenced by fear, unawed by law, and without any controul from conſcience, which indeed they conditionally reſign upon their appointment to office. Not content with an open violation of law, and the conſtitution, with the audacious eraſement of a judicial record, and commitment of the Lord Mayor, and one of the repreſentatives of the capital to priſon; they offer new injury and freſh affront to the people in general, and the city of London in par-

incurred upon the civil liſt—taxes oppreſſively continued, and public credit upon the

ticular, by the anſwer they perſuaded your Majeſty to give to the late conſtitutional petition and remonſtrance. The delicacy which your Majeſty diſcovers, as to the *conſtitutional exertion of your prerogative*, would be very pleaſing and ſatisfactory to the people, if they ſaw it take place in every inſtance. But it is with concern they hear the mention of this *conſtitutional exertion*, when ſubjects are laying their grievances before the throne, with reaſonable expectations that the *conſtitutional exertion of your prerogative*, Sir, would redreſs them. Had your Majeſty been counſelled againſt every unconſtitutional exertion of your prerogative, the King would not have been under the diſagreeable neceſſity of *receiving* and *rejecting* the petitions and remonſtrances of the people.

Your Majeſty is adviſed further to ſay, *the city of London will always find me diſpoſed to liſten to any well-founded complaint.* As this is delivered in ſuch terms, decency obliges us to take it in a *prophetic* ſenſe; and therefore we ſhould *hope* for a fulfilment; I ſay *hope*, for we cannot expect to ſee ſuch an alteration of the whole ſyſtem and conduct of St. James, as is abſolutely neceſſary to the accompliſhment of ſuch an event.—We have no leading traces of it as yet.

Can your Majeſty entertain a doubt of the *truth* of the aſſertions and allegations ſet forth in the petition? Or do your miniſters, Sir, ſo far *deceive* and *diſappoint* you, that they

the ſtretch, to furniſh inſtruments of our own deſtruction — ſubjects diſſatisfied, because they conceal the open violation of the people's rights, and their infamous triumphs over their liberties, from you?—The city of London, Sir, and moſt of your ſubjects, not only ſee and feel theſe things to be true, but they conſider them as groſs, notorious, and tyrannical violations of the laws and conſtitution; and with real ſorrow do they hear the King from his throne, virtually declaring, that complaints ariſing from ſuch violations, are not well-founded. And the concern of the people, Sir, in ſeeing their King ſo far *miſled* and *deluded*, thus to treat his ſubjects and their remonſtrances, is equal to what their *gracious* ſovereign may feel, when he ſees the people *renewing*, *in reprehenſible terms*, *a requeſt*, *with which* his abandoned and traiterous miniſters *have repeatedly* adviſed him *not to comply*. What, Sir! ſhall convince you, that the complaints of your ſubjects are well-founded, if now you doubt? Muſt they come to you when miniſterial violation has left them no privilege, and when tyranny has bereft them of every right, and bleſſing but that of complaint? When this is the caſe, your majeſty would perhaps deem it treaſon to petition, and your miniſters make it death to remonſtrate. Deſpotiſm, Sir, takes ſuch haſty ſtrides; as it lives by diſorder, the more ruin it cauſes, the better it thrives. Avoid, Sir, the beginning, or at leaſt ſtop in the midſt of diſtreſs. When once a King has ſo far forgot his duty, or rather tranſgreſſed it, as to think that his people's com-

cauſe not properly governed; and inſulted, becauſe not paſſive ſlaves; how can the

plaints are perſonal inſults; and that his dignity is to grow out of their diſgrace; when he ſees their rights invaded, and hears without compaſſion and redreſs their honeſt petitions; but little is wanting to make him believe, that his grandeur and magnificence can only be maintained by impoveriſhing his ſubjects; and that the blood of the people may cheaply flow to nouriſh the rank ſeeds of his luxuriant tyranny.

Whether or no your *compaſſionate* miniſters have not attempted to inure your *tender* mind to ſcenes of popular diſtreſs and murder, I will not pretend to ſay. Perhaps Lord Barrington and Lord Weymouth may have repented of their approbation of the bloody buſineſs of St. George's-fields; and the manes of unavenged ſubjects may be placated now the Kennedys are tranſported.—— Perhaps you, Sir, repoſe in perfect peace. But Lord Bute—and upon him may heaven's juſt vengeance fall, for I look upon him as the maſter of the mighty buſineſs of our ruin; *Quid enim mali aut ſceleris fingi aut cogitari poteſt, quod non ille conceperit?*—is but ill at eaſe; whether from conſcience or deſpair I know not: but let him know, and that from an hand that will never wear chains while it can wield a ſword, that the people of England think it as much their duty to aſſert their liberty, as he, and your Majeſty's miniſters think it their's to deſtroy it.

TRIBUNUS.

king

king come forward to his people with confidence? †—With what face can he aſcend the throne, and beg his ſubjects to furniſh him with freſh ſupplies, not for the neceſſary ſupport of the ſtate, but to enable him to give freſh penſions and rewards to thoſe who betray and ruin it? *—Should the exigencies of ſtate really demand a larger ſupply, what miniſter can he employ to hazard the demand? Conſcious of his ſituation, and fearful of conſequences, the exigencies of ſtate muſt give way to the exigencies of his

† The public revenues are not to be meaſured by what the people are able, but by what they ought to give; and if they are meaſured by what they are able to give, it ought to be by what they are able to give for a conſtancy. *Spt. of Laws*, B. 13. Ch. 2.

* Would it not ſeem a wonder, ſays Socrates, if he ſhould be acknowledged a good herdſman, who leſſens the number, or multiplies the ill qualities of his flock? It is a much greater wonder, if he who hath the command of the ſtate, and both *waſtes the ſtrength*, and *corrupts the manners* of his ſubjects, doth not bluſh at his miſmanagement, and confeſs himſelf a bad governor.

own affairs: the honour of the nation muſt be ſacrificed to the domeſtic ambition of the prince, and his miniſters; repeated inſults muſt be borne, and tamely ſubmitted to: though offended, we muſt inglorioufly beg pardon; Spain may, with impunity, ſtop, and diſmantle our ſhips, impriſon our countrymen, affront our admirals, take Falkland's Iſland, break her moſt ſolemn treaties, and inſult us with new acts of perfidy: the enemy may burn our arſenals, and then openly defy us; it muſt all be ſubmitted to with opprobrious meanneſs; the king cannot ſtand forth as the defender of his people's violated rights, and his own dignity: the luſtre of the crown fades under the diſgrace, and the national honour is brought into univerſal contempt.

When this is the caſe, men of abilities and virtue will deſert the court; and the hopes that the people may entertain from their

their wiſdom, be for ever excluded. Men will be admitted into poſts of honour, and offices of emolument, upon their own terms;* and be *paid* for *ruining* their country.—If thoſe who enjoy any rewards for eſſential ſervices, (and ſuch there are, and muſt be in the *worſt of times*; for virtue muſt ſometimes be countenanced to ſave appearances)

* Upon the reſignation of the D. of Grafton, every thinking man ſuppoſed ſuch a ſyſtem was to be purſued, as even his proweſs was not hardy enough to undertake. This, with the deſperate buſineſs of the Middleſex election, made many heſitate to accept of places, which adminiſtration offered, and offered in vain. At length, a gentleman of rank, and ſome abilities, accepted of a lucrative place upon condition of his re-election. It was promiſed. The beſt way by which the miniſter judged he could fulfil his engagements to the member, was, to promiſe the electors, that a bill ſhould be procured for the exportation of malt. It ſucceeded: and the conſequence of this infamous treaty was, that large quantities of barley were inſtantly bought up, (which proportionably affected the price of other grain, and miſerably afflicted the poor) to enable the venal electors to foreſtal the fair dealer, who had not the advantage of this miniſterial information.—Such proceedings diſgrace all government.

are called upon in extremity to return to their duty, and the public; they will not conſider themſelves under very preſſing obligations to do this, when they reflect on the great abatement there is in a call from favours which they receive in common with men whoſe vices are their only recommendation. By ſuch means, all diſtinctions are thrown down—virtue is debaſed by vice being put upon a footing with it.—What does Lord Chatham's honourable penſion ſpeak, in point of reward for his ſervices, when the names of Dyſon, Bradſhaw, and numberleſs others of the ſame ſtamp, ſtand upon the penſionary liſt?

Our ſituation as a nation demands the ſerious attention of every man; and requires the wiſdom of the ableſt ſtateſman to ſave us from utter ruin; which can alone be done by recurring to the firſt pure principles of the con-

conſtitution. * I am authorized to make the aſſertion, by the ſtate of our finances, the national debt, and the applications of the ſinking fund.

When we come to conſider, that the public money, raiſed to defray the neceſſary expences of the ſtate, is applied to corrupt our repreſentatives to betray us in parliament; and the ſtrength of government, by this means, converted into a principle of diſſolution; when we ſee men ſurrounding the throne, whoſe anceſtors were the avowed enemies of the family that now ſits upon it; when the king's prerogative is exerted inconſiſtent with its limitations, and in oppoſition to the law of the land; when we complain, and have

* The great Monteſquieu juſtly remarks, When once a free ſtate is corrupted, there is no poſſibility of remedying any of the riſing evils, but by removing the corruption, and reſtoring its loſt principles: every other correction is either uſeleſs, or a new evil.

Spt. of Laws, B. 8. Ch. 12.

no redreſs; mourn, and have no pity: when we ſee royal favour ſhine upon the baſe betrayers of our liberties, who occupy every department of ſtate, both at home and abroad; * and the only friends of the conſtitution diſmiſſed from employments, and treated with diſreſpect; while we ſee our national honour ſacrificed to the miniſters baſe timidity; and open affronts offered to the Engliſh flag, ſubmitted to, nay palliated, becauſe the monies that ſhould be expended in the ſupport of a neceſſary and honourable

* Before moſt of our governors were ſent abroad, and the preſent Lord Lieutenant of Ireland appointed, I wiſh his Majeſty had recollected the wiſe anſwer of Artaxerxes to a courtier, who petitioned him for the government of a certain province, with three thouſand pieces of gold; "I will give you the money," ſaid the king, "for it will not make me indigent; but I cannot give you the government, for that would make me unjuſt." *Eurip. in Rheſ.*

Themiſtocles gave excellent advice to a prince—Never uſe, ſays he, the ſervice of a wicked perſon in exerciſing your office; for in whatever point he offends, the guilt will be laid to your charge. *Themiſt. Orat.*

war,

war, have been laviſhed in an inglorious peace: while we behold ſuch things, and ſee that our ruin is precipitated by the men who ſhould ſtretch forth their hands to ſave us; we ſhould deſerve to fall in the deſtruction that threatens us, if we gave not the alarm, or attempted not our own reſcue and ſalvation.

Our ſituation is critical and dangerous; but, thank God, not entirely the object of deſpair.—Let not our liberties be torn from us making no reſiſtance, as if they were not a bleſſing!——nor let us be anxious, even for the preſervation of life, after the mighty ſacrifice of freedom, for which alone life is worth the having.——I am ſtopt in the warmth of my addreſſes to my countrymen, by the complexion of the times; and ſuppreſs thoſe exhortations that wicked miniſters would ſoon conſtrue into libel, or treaſon. But their own deeds are ſtronger incitements

to reſentment and revenge, than any thing I can urge—may they have their reward.

After all, it may perhaps be expected that I ſhould point out ſome effectual remedy to theſe ſeveral evils. The remedy is more eaſy I fear than the means, or the probability that they will be applied: but as it reſts with ourſelves, there is ſome hope that in time it may be ſo.—But as a matter of this ſort is of a very delicate nature, it becomes me only to ſuggeſt, by way of query, the following conſiderations to my countrymen.

I. Is not the *long duration* of parliaments one means, if not a leading cauſe, of ſome of the evils we complain of?

II. Is not the *unequal* repreſentation of the people, a real and conſtitutional foundation of complaint, which ought ſpeedily to be reformed?

III. Is not the preſent *mode* of election the real cauſe of bribery and corruption?

IV. Would

IV. Would not elections be more conſtitutionally conducted by an open ballot?

V. Is not a PLACE BILL, from the whole of our reaſoning, as well as complaints, abſolutely *neceſſary*.

VI. Beſides the excluſions which the law has already pointed out, ſhould not the ſons of peers, general officers of the army, and navy, lawyers, agents and contractors, be excluded from ſitting in the houſe?

VII. Is not the excluſion of the ſons of peers warranted by the ſpirit of that law which precludes any peer of the realm from interpoſing in the election of a commoner? —Does the military profeſſion, in which I include the navy, fit men for ſenators? Or rather do not the neceſſary avocations of their duty plead againſt their admiſſion into parliament? If their advice be ever wanting, over and above that information which the ſecretary at war, or Lords of the Admiralty

can

can, or ought, at any time, to give the houſe, may they not be examined either by the council or the parliament—?

The forms of the houſe, as to the conſtruction of a law, are ſo well underſtood, that it would in this, and in all other caſes, except the critical conſtruction and explication of law, be an affront upon our country gentlemen to ſuppoſe, that the information or direction of the long-rob'd gentlemen were neceſſary. If at any time this is the caſe, may not the attorney, or ſolicitor-general, with any others, learned in the law, be conſulted in the Houſe of Commons, as the judges are in the Houſe of Lords?—Do not the avocations in the courts below, plead ſtrongly for their not ſitting in the ſenate above?

Agencies and contracts are temptations ſo ſtrong, when they come in the form of trade, or a man's buſineſs, that they are hardly to be

be reſiſted. Does not fact ſpeak loudly on the queſtion?

I venture to throw out theſe queries in a curſory manner. I profeſs myſelf an incompetent judge, in ſo great an affair. Nor do I think very great preciſion in the matter, at preſent, of any conſiderable importance; for if ever we have men, whoſe hearts have virtue enough to bring the firſt great leading queſtion ſeriouſly into debate, and carry it, I have no doubt, that from the wiſdom of their heads the bill will be well conſtructed, duly qualified, and wiſely confined. —Our important duty, as conſtituents, is, upon every vacancy, or at the next general election, to mark the men who have betrayed our intereſt, and that have penſions, in the preſent parliament; and not return them again: which that we may do, I have, in the *Appendix*, given a liſt of ſuch *honourable* gentlemen.

Another

Another matter of great importance is, that before ever we promiſe a vote to any candidate, that we exact and demand a written, ſerious declaration, that he will do every thing in his power, while one of our repreſentatives, to promote a bill for *ſhortening the duration of parliaments*, with a *place bill* at large, or under all, or any of the reſtrictions before-mentioned.

The people muſt do ſomething for themſelves; it is right to attempt it conſtitutionally, that, if they fail, they may, with the allowance of all ſound politicians, and the great authority of Judge Blackſtone, exert, unblamed, in the time "*when neceſſity, and* "*the ſafety of the whole ſhall require it, thoſe* "*inherent, though latent powers of ſociety,* "*which no climate, no time, no conſtitution* "*can ever deſtroy or diminiſh.*"

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

THE reaſon why the author has not here printed the ſpeeches on both ſides the queſtion, is, firſt, on account of their length; and next, that the chief arguments againſt the motion will be found recited in the ſpeeches, wherein they are ably refuted. He has not done this from any partiality: he wiſhes moſt ſincerely, that every one who reads theſe pages would have recourſe to that important debate: they will there find the arguments of court ſycophants, and intereſted miniſters, expoſed and invalidated by reaſonings irrefragably confirmed by *facts* in our own day. In the ſpeeches here printed, ſuch arguments are advanced in favour of the queſtion, as are not only concluſive and important in themſelves, but as it were *prophetical predictions* of thoſe dangerous and deſtructive conſequences which we *now* actually experience, by the exiſtence of all thoſe political evils in their fulleſt latitude, to prevent which, this ſalutary and moſt important motion firſt was made: a motion of ſuch importance, and magnitude, as involves in itſelf liberty, and its moſt intereſting concerns, as well as the welfare, and very exiſtence, of our admirable ſyſtem of government.

The ſeveral ſpeeches in favour of a Place Bill, delivered in the Houſe of Commons in the year 1739. *Taken from the* Hiſtory and Proceedings of the Houſe of Commons.

After a ſummons of the houſe, the important debate was opened by Samuel Sandys, Eſq. in the following manner:

SIR,

" I am now going to lay before you a propoſition, which has already been ſeveral times made to you, without meeting with that ſucceſs which I thought it deſerved; but as I think it a good one, and abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of our conſtitution, I am far from being diſcouraged by its former bad ſucceſs; nor ſhall I be diſcouraged from a future attempt, even though it ſhould now meet with as bad a reception as heretofore, becauſe I am fully convinced of the truth of that obſervation, which was long ago made by one of our beſt lawyers, that a good bill or motion once propoſed in parliament, and entered upon our journals, can never die: it may at firſt meet with bad ſucceſs: it may meet with repeated bad ſucceſs; *but, unleſs our conſtitution be abſolutely and irrecoverably deſtroyed, it will by its own merits at laſt force its way through the ſeveral branches of our legiſlature.*

" The propoſition I am to make, Sir, is plainly, and in ſhort this, *that criminals may not be allowed to be their own judges, and that our liberties may not be committed to the keeping of thoſe, who are retained to deſtroy them.* It is the duty of parliament to redreſs all public grievances, and puniſh all high and heinous offenders who have been artful or powerful enough to evade the laws of the kingdom.

dom. It is the duty of parliament to grant no more *money* for the public ſervice than what is *abſolutely neceſſary*, and to ſee that money *properly applied*, and *duly accounted for*: and it is the duty of parliament to watch over the liberties and privileges of the people, by taking care not to paſs any laws that are inconſiſtent with the liberties and privileges of the people, and by providing ſpeedy and effectual remedies againſt all encroachments that have been, or may be, made by ambitious princes, or guilty miniſters. Theſe, Sir, are among the chief of the duties of parliament; but how can we expect a performance, if a majority of the members be ſuch, whoſe ſelf-preſervation or ſecurity depends upon their *neglecting*, or acting *contrary* to theſe duties? Can we expect that public grievances will be redreſſed, if a majority of parliament be ſuch as have themſelves been, or ſuch as are the friends and confederates of thoſe that have been the *cauſe* of theſe public grievances? Can we expect that any high offender will be puniſhed by parliament, if the majority of it be ſuch as have been *companions* and *ſharers* with him in his crimes, or ſuch whoſe chief ſubſiſtence depends upon *ſcreening* him from juſtice? Can we expect that any ſupply demanded by the crown will be *refuſed*, if it is to be granted by thoſe, whoſe chief *ſubſiſtence* depends upon making the grant; or that the public money will be *properly applied*, or *duly accounted for*, if thoſe that have applied, or may apply, it to their own uſe, are to be the only inſpectors of the public accounts? Or laſtly, Sir, *can we expect that a parliament will guard againſt the encroachments of an ambitious prince, or guilty miniſter, if the majority of that parliament be ſuch as have the whole, or a neceſſary part of their ſubſiſtence, from the places or penſions*

they hold at the arbitrary will of that ambitious prince, or guilty miniſter?

"Theſe are queſtions, Sir, which, in my opinion, can be anſwered in the affirmative by no man, that will and dare make uſe of his reaſon; and yet every one of theſe queſtions muſt, I think, be anſwered in the affirmative by thoſe who affirm, that our conſtitution can never be in any danger from a majority, or near a majority of this houſe's being compoſed of ſuch as hold places and penſions at the arbitrary will of the crown. I ſhall grant, Sir, that it may be neceſſary for us to have amongſt us ſome of the chief officers of the crown. It may be neceſſary to have always in this houſe ſome of the chief officers of the Treaſury, Admiralty, and army, as well as ſeveral others of thoſe that are employed by his majeſty as chief officers in the executive part of our government. Theſe, I ſay, it may be neceſſary to have amongſt us, in order to give us ſuch informations, as may often become neceſſary in the ſeveral branches of buſineſs that come regularly before this houſe; but, I am ſure, it is no way neceſſary, and quite inconſiſtent with the dignity of this houſe, to have it filled with *clerks of offices*, and *inferior officers* of our navy and army. I confeſs I have the greateſt regard for ſuch of thoſe as we have at preſent amongſt us; becauſe, I hope they have all ſo much honour, that they would diſdain to ſacrifice their duty, as members of this houſe, for any ſelfiſh conſideration; but, we cannot be aſſured, that thoſe who ſucceed them in their offices and employments, will be gentlemen of ſo much honour, and as they may likewiſe ſucceed them with regard to their ſeats in this houſe, our conſtitution may be thereby brought into the utmoſt danger; for, if I were not well aſſured of the honour of thoſe officers we

have

have now amongſt us, we have already ſuch a number, that I ſhould think our conſtitution upon the brink of deſtruction; and, as this number may increaſe ſo as, in a ſhort time, to become the majority of this houſe, whilſt we have it in our power, we ought to take care to provide againſt this danger, by limiting the number of officers that are to have ſeats in this houſe; *for, if the majority of this houſe ſhould once come to be compoſed of officers, and thoſe officers ſuch as had a greater regard to the places they poſſeſs, or preferments they hope for, than to the liberties and conſtitution of their country, it would be ridiculous to think of getting the approbation of this houſe to any ſuch regulation.* Therefore, Sir, as this is not yet, I hope, our unfortunate caſe, I ſhall beg leave to move, That leave may be given to bring in a bill, for the better ſecuring the freedom of parliaments, by limiting the number of officers to ſit in the Houſe of Commons."

George Lyttleton, Eſq;

SIR,

" An honourable gentleman, at the lower end of the houſe, threw out a propoſal to ſend us all to ſchool again, for the reforming our manners. Sir, I think our care ſhould be to prevent members of parliament from being at ſchool, when they are here, from being under the laſh of an inſolent miniſter, as, if we may credit hiſtory, has happened in ſome former parliaments. Sir, I do not mean the parliament in Queen Elizabeth's reign, however ſervile they are repreſented to have been, by an honourable member over the way. I am afraid the practice of miniſters naming members to boroughs at their own will and pleaſure, which

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he told us was uſed by the earl of Leiceſter, has not been dropped ſince that time; and I wiſh our poſterity may never ſee days leſs advantageous to liberty. Elizabeth loved her people, deſired their honour, regarded their intereſt, ſhe heard their complaints againſt the greateſt, the moſt favoured of her miniſters; and yet I will own, Sir, there were many wrong things done in her reign, becauſe ſufficient reſtraints were not then laid upon the power of the crown: and therefore the example of her reign holds out a uſeful leſſen to us, *that even to the beſt of princes we ſhould not allow ſuch a dangerous influence, as may tempt them, by the advice of bad miniſters, to encroach on our freedom.*

" Sir, conſidering how this bill comes recommended, I ſhould have imagined, gentlemen would have thought it owing to themſelves, if not to their country, to ſeem to treat it with a little reſpect. But not ſo much as to allow it to be brought into the houſe, to oppoſe the principle of it, is indeed very extraordinary. There have been times, when, only for the ſake of that principle, bills of a much leſs moderate nature, and to which there lay many objections that cannot be made againſt this, have paſſed here without oppoſition. *Sir, for my own part, I think, when I am promoting this bill, that I am contending for all I ever thought myſelf bound to contend for; that I am oppoſing all I ever thought it my duty to oppoſe: all faults and miſmanagements in the adminiſtration of government, the miſunderſtanding, the neglect, the giving up of all national intereſts, diſcontent at home, diſhonour abroad, whatever can be conceived moſt detrimental to the good of the public, is all ſo cloſely inwoven with the evil this bill would prevent, that it can be guarded againſt, or remedied by no other poſſible means.* Sir, how far I am from ſuppoſing, that merely to have

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an employment, without other cauſe of ſuſpicion, implies any notion of guilt or corruption, I need no other proof than the ſenſe I muſt have of my own ſituation. But though I have an employment myſelf, I think it ſtill undeniably true, that the nation has reaſon to be jealous of the number of placemen in parliament; becauſe nations always regard things, and not perſons; becauſe they conſider the temptation in general, not a particular power of reſiſting it; and becauſe the public wiſdom ought to proportion the degree of reſtraint to the degree of danger, that is either felt or foreſeen.

" While this houſe is full of independent gentlemen, or with ſuch placemen only whoſe places are not ſo much the beſt of their property, that they cannot riſk the loſs of them without a ſpirit of martyrdom, who have ſomething of their own ſufficient to outweigh their employments, and while the number even of theſe ſhall be confined within ſome moderate bounds, a miniſter muſt regard this aſſembly as an awful tribunal, before which he is conſtantly to account for his conduct: he muſt reſpect your judgments, he muſt dread your cenſures, he muſt feel your ſuper-intendency. But I can imagine, a future Houſe of Commons ſo crowded with placemen, that a ſpectator in the gallery might be apt to miſtake, and think himſelf at the levee of a miniſter inſtead of a parliament. The benches here may be covered not only with officers of rank in the government, not only with the ſervants of the crown, but with the ſervants, perhaps, of thoſe ſervants; and what ſentiments, Sir, have we reaſon to think the ſight of a houſe ſo filled would excite in a miniſter? Would he think himſelf in the preſence of his country, or in the midſt of a guard that would enable

enable him to defy its juſtice, and deride its reſentment? The poſſibility of this happening hereafter, is the ground of this bill, which therefore the people of England do not only conſider as a ſingle point to be gained for them upon any preſent neceſſity, but as a general ſecurity againſt all they apprehend for the future.

" Sir, my worthy friend who made you this motion, in the opening of it, explained to you ſufficiently, that there is no intent of running into any extremes. If I thought there was, I would oppoſe it as much as any man here. I know but one thing more prepoſterous than ſuch a general place-bill, as would exclude all perſons in office from a ſeat in this houſe, and that is, to leave the number of them under no limitation at all. But, for fear of ſtarving, muſt we die of a ſurfeit? Between theſe two abſurdities, can no medium be found? Can't we continue thoſe among us who are of any uſe to the houſe, who can give any aſſiſtance, any weight, any facility, any grace to our proceedings, and ſhut the door againſt others, whom it is neither decent, nor ſafe to admit? Sir, the doing this is eaſy; it will be done by this bill; it is what the wiſdom of former parliaments would have done long before now. But the reaſon they did it not was, it never entered into their thoughts to conceive that ſome, who have ſince ſat in parliament, could attempt to come there; I do not mean from any perſonal incapacity, but from the nature itſelf of their offices, incompatible almoſt with the very idea of a member of parliament. *It is a ſurprizing thing, but it is verified by what we ſee every day, that the common practice of ſome ages goes beyond even the fears of the paſt.* We muſt therefore ſupply from experience what our predeceſſors failed to foreſee; and we are called upon

upon to do ſo by the unanimous cry of the nation. Sir, the greateſt affairs before us are of leſs im-importance than this: it is better Spain ſhould invade the freedom of the American ſeas, than the crown of England violate the independence of parliament. It is not Spaniſh or French arms, but Spaniſh and French maxims of government, that we ſhould have moſt to fear from, if the vigilant caution, the jealous ſpirit of liberty in this houſe did not concur with the goodneſs, the natural goodneſs of his Majeſty, to ſecure our free conſtitution. Let the Cortes of Spain, let the parliament of Paris be a warning to this; let them ſhew us what we may come to, if we don't prevent the growth of corruption, before it produces here the inſenſible, gradual, fatal change it did there.

" Sir, I am trying to recollect what objections have been made to this bill, and I proteſt I can find none that ſeem to me to want a reply. One chiefly inſiſted upon is, that it carries an air of ſuſpicion. Sir, in all the ſtates that I have read of, antient and modern, the moſt ſuſpicious people have been always the lateſt enſlaved. To ſuſpect human frailty in tempting circumſtances is a very natural jealouſy, and a too ſecure confidence will hardly be thought a parliamentary virtue. It is painful, indeed, to be ſuſpected, but the greater the pain, the greater the deſire ſhould be to remove that ſuſpicion. But, Sir, againſt the preſent Houſe of Commons, no ſuch ſuſpicion can be conceived. — Upon what grounds ſhould it be founded? Upon what probability? Has the private diſcourſe of ſuch gentlemen here, ever been different from their public behaviour? Have they ever talked one way, and voted another? Have there been any indications of a private intereſt, that of any one man ever prevailing over that of

the nation, againſt fact, reaſon, or juſtice? Have not the majority here conſtantly ſhewn the ſtrongeſt conviction, that their conduct was ſtrictly conformable to the moſt diſintereſted love of their country? Such a Houſe of Commons ought not to be, is not ſuſpected: But granting ſuch a doubt to have been formed, is this the way to remove it? Will the rejecting this bill clear our character, or can all the art and power of calumny give half the weight to an imputation of that kind as ſuch a proceeding?

"Sir, to thoſe who treat this bill as a chimerical thing, an idle, ſpeculative project, I will ſay but one word, *that the moſt chimerical thing in nature, is the notion of a free conſtitution, where the reſtraining powers are not entirely exempt from dependency.* Such liberty is, indeed, a ſpeculation fit for ſchool-boys; for what would terms and appearances avail, if independence were loſt? You might retain the vain enſigns of your former authority, but would they give you any dignity, would they be of any uſe to the public? The mace there upon your table, what would it ſignify? It might be borne before you with ridiculous pomp, but it would be what Cromwell called it once, a mere bauble; or if it had any weight, it would be only to oppreſs, not to protect.

"Sir, the preſent form of our government, keep it but free from corruption, is ſo wiſely conſtituted, the powers in it are ſo happily mixed, that it has all the advantages of a republic, without the defects and evils attending one. But, on the other ſide, I muſt ſay, *that if it ſhould be corrupted, if the controul of parliament ſhould be bought off by the crown, the very reverſe would be true; and it would have all the defects, all the evils of an abſolute monarchy, without the advantages; it would be a more*

expenſive

expenſive, and worſe adminiſtered abſolute power. Sir, I hope it is underſtood, that in what I have ſaid, I am only contending for a proviſional ſecurity againſt a miſchief not yet felt in all its malignity, but yet, of ſo increaſing a nature, and ſuch ruinous conſequences, that we muſt be blind not to foreſee them, and worſe than careleſs not to prevent. I will only add, that every year we delay this ſecurity, may probably add both to the neceſſity and difficulty of obtaining it; and that people out a-doors may be apt to judge from the ſucceſs of this queſtion to-day, if even now it does not come a little too late."

Edward Southwell, Eſq.

SIR,

"The bill now moved for, is of ſo great conſequence, ſo ardently deſired by the nation in general, that I cannot ſatisfy myſelf with giving a bare aſſent to the motion for bringing it in, and therefore, I muſt venture upon the hard taſk of betraying my own inability, rather than ſit ſilent in a debate, whereon, I think, the freedom and independency of parliament, and the very being of our conſtitution depend. A debate, Sir, which, by its event, muſt, in effect, determine, *whether the Commons of Great Britain are ever hereafter to be properly repreſented in this houſe, whether we are really to be any longer a free people or no.*

"It would ill become me, Sir, to dare to inſinuate the leaſt reflection upon any of thoſe gentlemen who have the honour to be employed in his Majeſty's ſervice, or to be diſtinguiſhed by his Royal favour. Their rank and their ſtation claim a due reſpect, and I have ever paid them ſuch as becomes a freeman. As gentlemen, and

as individuals, I have a great regard for them; but as legiſlators, and as an aggregate body, I muſt own, their numbers, their power, and their influence here, may give juſt grounds of jealouſy and apprehenſion, to every man that underſtands the nature and admires the wiſdom of our happy conſtitution; eſpecially if we ſhould ever happen to ſee an union, or coalition of their ſeveral intereſts, for their mutual ſupport, and, as it were, in one common cauſe, whenever the ſtate of our army, or navy, of our Treaſury, or revenue, or of the nation in general, ſhall come under the conſideration of this houſe.

" We juſtly value ourſelves on the wiſdom and equity of our laws, for trying the life, liberty, and property of the meaneſt ſubject, by impartial judges, and diſintereſted juries. Shall we be thus careful of the liberties and properties of private men, and take no care of the liberties and properties of the people in general? Shall we remove a juror, in a caſe of private property, if it appears that he has an intereſt in either ſide of the queſtion; and in a caſe of public property, ſhall we admit a majority, or near a majority, of thoſe that are to be judges, to conſiſt of ſuch as have the whole, or the greateſt part of their ſubſiſtence, depending upon one ſide, perhaps the wrong ſide, of the queſtion? Surely, Sir, this great council, which is entruſted with the happineſs, the property, and purſe of the nation, demands, at leaſt, equal care and attention: *the guardians of the laws, liberties, and public intereſt, ought, above all men, to be diſintereſted and independent; free not only from the imputation, but even from the leaſt ſuſpicion of any pecuniary biaſs whatever.* In private life, it would be abſurd to allow any man to ſit as judge and jury in his own cauſe; and in this houſe,

houſe, where our All is at ſtake, is it not equally abſurd, may it not be deſtructive?

" Sir, there is no deſign to turn out of this houſe, every gentleman that has a place or office under the crown. By the bill now moved for, all thoſe who have places or offices under the crown are to be excluded from having ſeats in this houſe, except ſuch placemen and officers as ſhall be named in the bill; and when this exception comes to be filled up, it will appear, that there may ſtill be at leaſt 150 placemen and officers in this houſe, which ſurely is a number ſufficient for anſwering all the good purpoſes of the crown; and, I hope, no gentleman will ſay, we ought to have ſuch a number of placemen and officers in this houſe, as may anſwer thoſe bad purpoſes which ſome future ambitious king, or bad miniſter, may happen to have in view, or may be prompted to have in view, when he conſiders, that he has ſuch a great number of placemen and officers in this houſe.

" The long and expenſive wars this nation has been obliged to carry on, for the juſt defence of our religion, our laws, and our liberties, have engaged us in immenſe debts: theſe debts ſtill ſubſiſt, and have had this fatal conſequence, that, while they have ſettled the balance of power abroad, I fear they have overturned the balance of power at home. They have raiſed a numerous ſwarm of revenue and exciſe-officers, and other tax-gatherers, who have overſpread the nation like locuſts. It is well known what influence theſe officers and tax-gatherers have upon elections; and I may alſo ſay, it is well known, what uſe they make of it. They influence our elections, not only while they live, but alſo when they die; for many electors are influenced by the hopes of ſucceeding them.

We

" We are again engaged in a juſt and neceſſary war, whereby our fleets are become more numerous, our land forces greatly increaſed, and more and more levies of marines every day made. Theſe augmentations muſt throw a new weight of power into that ſcale, which ſeems already to be charged beyond its due proportion, and of courſe the freedom of parliament, and the ſecurity of our conſtitution, will be thereby more endangered, which has raiſed great jealouſies all over the nation.

" This bill, Sir, ſeems to be the only ſure method to allay theſe jealouſies, and to prevent theſe dangers. It is not meant to exclude all placemen from parliament: it is meant only to reſtrain and limit the number of placemen, which in future parliaments may become ſo great, as to be inconſiſtent with the freedom of parliament, or the preſervation of our conſtitution. This effect the bill will have, if, luckily for us and our poſterity, it be paſſed into a law; but this is not the only good effect it will have. Beſides this, it will have many other good effects: it will not only limit the number of placemen in parliament, but it will alſo ſoon leſſen their number, and their expence in general. *If this bill ſhould be paſſed, new places would not be created, many old ones would be aboliſhed, no more officers would be employed than were abſolutely neceſſary; and, I verily believe, no more would be allowed them than they ſtrictly earned: a ſmall ſalary would then ſatisfy a clerk in an office, who might now, perhaps, reject it, as a member of this houſe; and men might well afford to ſerve for half pay, who had no intereſt to ſupport, and no other merit neceſſary for the poſt they enjoy, or the poſt they aſpire to, than the bare qualification for that, and that alone. They would then become men of one calling, and of one buſineſs: they would be more diligent and faithful in the diſcharge of*

their

their duty, becauſe they would be more afraid of being called to account.

" The nation, Sir, grows daily more jealous of its liberties, and more zealous for the ſecurity of them, by the ſucceſs of this bill; and, therefore, I hope, that, at leaſt, ſo much deference will be paid to the voice of the people, as to admit their repreſentatives fully to debate the merits of this important cauſe. *The voice of the people is well worthy the attention, the ſerious attention of a wiſe legiſlature: it is a voice that firſt or laſt will be heard, and will have its effect: it is a voice that is not to be ſilenced, that is not to be ſmothered, much leſs to be rejected with contempt.*

" Therefore, Sir, in duty to his Majeſty, that he may reign happy in the hearts, in the affections, and confidence of his people, which alone can render him powerful at home, and formidable abroad; in juſtice to my country, that theſe valuable rights and privileges, derived to us from our anceſtors, may be tranſmitted down to poſterity; in diſcharge of my own conſcience, and of the great truſt repoſed in me by my conſtituents, I thought myſelf obliged, notwithſtanding the juſt ſenſe I have of my inability, to give this public teſtimony of my approbation of what is propoſed; and I do moſt heartily join in the motion for bringing in this important and moſt neceſſary bill."

William Pulteney, Eſq;

SIR,

" The oppoſition made to this motion is, in my opinion, one of the ſtrongeſt arguments that can be made uſe of in its favour, and muſt, I think, appear ſo to every man, who conſiders the perſons concerned in that oppoſition, and the arguments they

they make uſe of for ſupporting it. Who are the perſons that oppoſe this motion? Who were they that have always oppoſed ſuch motions? *Placemen, miniſters, and the favourites or penſioners of miniſters.* What do they ſay for juſtifying their oppoſition? They deny a principle, a maxim, which, in all ages, in all countries, has hitherto been acknowledged, and, upon which, many of our laws now in being are founded. That a gentleman's behaviour in this houſe may be influenced by a place, or a penſion, is a maxim univerſally acknowledged, and in this kingdom ſo much eſtabliſhed, that we have, already, by law, excluded many of the former, and all the latter, from having ſeats in this houſe. We have, already, by law, excluded all penſioners from having ſeats in this houſe; and, I ſhould be glad to know the difference between a penſion of 1000*l.* a year, and a place with a ſalary of 1000*l.* a year. I know of none, ſave only that the latter is generally more valuable than the former; and, therefore, a gentleman will be more loth to loſe it, or to give a vote in this houſe, that may diſoblige a miniſter who can take it from him.

" I ſay, Sir, that a place, with a ſalary of 1000*l.* a year, is more valuable than a penſion of 1000*l.* a year; becauſe a place furniſhes a gentleman with an opportunity to ſerve his friends, and, perhaps, to provide ſome of them with little places or offices under him. To which I muſt add, that a place often furniſhes a gentleman, who is not very ſcrupulous, with an opportunity of *plundering* his country yearly, of twice, perhaps ten times, the value of his ſalary; and this, I muſt obſerve, makes another very material difference between a place and a penſion: a placeman may very probably be a perſon, whoſe conduct this houſe ought to enquire into: he may be a public criminal, and there-

fore

fore he will certainly be againſt an impartial and ſtrict enquiry into the conduct of any miniſter, officer, or placeman, leſt the enquiry ſhould at laſt light upon himſelf. There is, therefore, greater reaſon for excluding all placemen, than for excluding all penſioners from having ſeats in this houſe. Our admitting ſome of the former, does not proceed from an opinion, that a gentleman's behaviour may not be influenced by a place, as much as by a penſion, but from the neceſſity we are under, of having ſome great officers amongſt us, in order to give us proper information and direction, in many affairs that muſt come under our conſideration.

"For this reaſon, when I hear gentlemen, who have very good places, gravely telling us, that no gentleman of family or fortune can, by any place he may enjoy or expect, be induced to join in meaſures, that may be of dangerous conſequence to the conſtitution or liberties of his country, I think it is a clear proof, not only that the behaviour of a gentleman of family and fortune may be influenced by the poſts he enjoys or expects, but alſo, that his judgment may be biaſſed. He may be, thereby, induced to think thoſe things indifferent, or of no moment, that are far from being ſo: *He may be, thereby, induced to think the liberties of his country in no danger, when they are upon the very brink of deſtruction.* I ſhall grant, Sir, that we ought not raſhly, and without juſt cauſe, to make any alteration in our conſtitution, nor ought we to frighten ourſelves with fanciful dangers; but if the danger we now apprehend, from the great number of officers and placemen in this houſe, be ſuggeſted only by a melancholy and gloomy diſpoſition, that diſpoſition is, I am ſure, now become epidemical; *for there is not, I believe, a man in the nation, not*

poſſeſſed, or in expectation of ſome poſt or penſion under the crown, who does not apprehend this danger, or who is not convinced of its being not only real, but imminent. Placemen and penſioners may, it is true, be of a more gay diſpoſition than others, and therefore not ſo apt to apprehend our conſtitution's being in danger; but for this very reaſon, we ought not to have a majority of them in this houſe; for if ever we ſhould, I may prognoſticate, that their gayety will give the reſt of the nation good cauſe to be melancholy.

" An honourable gentleman who has had ſeveral, and has now a very good place, has been pleaſed to tell us, that we ought never to think of providing againſt any danger, till it be felt, as well as foreſeen. I do not know, Sir, what that gentleman may feel, or foreſee; but I can aſſure him, the nation thinks it has often felt the influence of places and penſions in this houſe. I ſhall not undertake the invidious taſk of ſhewing how, or when, that influence has been felt; but I may ſay in general, that even of late years, there have been many queſtions in this houſe, which would not have gone as they did, had we had few or no officers or placemen amongſt us; and if all the officers and placemen would now retire, or refuſe to give their votes in this queſtion, in which they may properly be ſaid to be parties concerned, I ſhould not doubt the ſucceſs of my honourable friend's motion. In this houſe, we ought to ſee with the ſame eyes our conſtituents ſee with, and we ought to feel what the nation feels, which is a good reaſon for our admitting but few placemen, and no penſioners amongſt us; *for both the ſeeing and feeling of him who receives* 500l. *or* 1000l. *a year, will always be very different from the ſeeing and feeling of thoſe that pay it.* The difference between the foreſight

ſight of placemen, and that of the nation, is notorious, and very remarkable, in this, that the former are mighty quick at foreſeeing thoſe dangers, which occaſion the keeping up of a ſtanding army, but with regard to thoſe dangers that threaten our conſtitution, they have hitherto appeared to be almoſt *quite blind*; whereas the nation has always been, and, I hope, always will be, quick-ſighted with regard to thoſe dangers that threaten our conſtitution, and never very apprehenſive of any of thoſe dangers that are uſually pretended for our keeping up a numerous ſtanding army. This, I ſay, is a remarkable difference, with regard to the faculty of ſeeing or foreſeeing any danger; and with regard to that of feeling, it is certain, a gentleman of 1000*l.* a year eſtate, who pays 700*l.* a year towards our national taxes, and has a penſion or ſalary of 1000*l.* a year paid him out of thoſe taxes, can never be ſo ſenſible of their weight, as another gentleman of 1000*l.* a year eſtate, who pays but 500*l.* a year towards our national taxes, and has no penſion or ſalary coming in. Therefore, I hope, the honourable gentleman will forgive me, if I ſay, *that our liberties may be in the moſt imminent and real danger, though neither he, nor any other placeman, either feels or foreſees it; and this, I think, is a very good reaſon, why our liberties ſhould not be committed to their keeping.*

" I ſhall admit, Sir, that a gentleman of family, fortune, character, and intereſt in his country, is not ſo liable to be influenced by a place he may enjoy or expect, as one who has none of theſe advantages; but will any gentleman ſay, that none but gentlemen of family, fortune, character, and intereſt in their country, can get themſelves choſen members of this houſe? Do no we know, that a miniſter may get a man choſen, though he has

neither family, fortune, character, nor intereſt to recommend him? Do not we know, that moſt of the little boroughs upon our coaſts are already, by means of our cuſtom-houſe, and ſea-officers, brought entirely under the direction of our adminiſtration? And if the late exciſe ſcheme had paſſed into law, I believe the caſe would, by this time, have been the ſame, with regard to moſt of the little inland boroughs in the kingdom. Suppoſe this ſhould hereafter be brought about, by means of ſome ſuch ſcheme, paſt into a law, at the end of a ſeſſion, and before people had time to conſider its conſequences: could we ſuppoſe, that a wicked or ambitious miniſter, would ever allow a gentleman of family or fortune to be choſen by any of the boroughs under his direction, unleſs he were ſuch a one as would be influenced by the place the miniſter had given, or could give him?

"In this caſe, Sir, let us conſider, that of the 513 members that repreſent England and Wales, there are but 92 choſen by counties, and of the remaining 421, there are at leaſt 350 choſen by cities, boroughs, and cinque-ports, were the adminiſtration would have the abſolute command and direction. If this ſhould ever happen to be our unlucky fate, can we ſuppoſe, that any gentleman would ſet up to be a member of this houſe, or a repreſentative even for any of our counties, but ſuch as reſolved to ſubmit, with regard to their behaviour here, to the abſolute direction of the prime miniſter? For no gentleman of honour would put himſelf to expence, or expoſe himſelf to the reſentment of an all-powerful miniſter, if, by ſetting up as a candidate at any election, he were abſolutely certain that he could thereby do his country no ſervice. *Inſtead of gentlemen of family, fortune, character, or intereſt in their country, we ſhould then ſee this*

this houſe filled with the loweſt tools, and vileſt ſycophants of abſolute power. Inſtead of this houſe's being a check upon miniſters, it would then, like the parliament of France, or the Roman ſenates under their emperors, be an inſtrument for the oppreſſions of miniſters, and a cloak for their crimes. The moſt rapacious plunderer, the moſt tyrannical oppreſſor, would then inſolently boaſt, that he did nothing but according to law, that the public treaſure was regularly accounted for in parliament, and that he was at all times ready to ſubmit his conduct to a parliamentary enquiry.

" Surely, Sir, no gentleman can think, that the liberties of this nation conſiſt in our having the reſemblance of a parliament. *We may have a parliament, that parliament may be choſen once every ſeven years, may ſit annually as it does now, may paſs laws, grant money, receive accounts, and even make enquiries, and yet we may have neither conſtitution nor liberty left; for if it ſhould once come to be in the power of the adminiſtration, to have always a majority in parliament, ready to obey the directions given them by the miniſters, there would be no neceſſity for deſtroying the very form of our conſtitution, or for making a direct and abſolute ſurrender of our liberties: without either of theſe, our ſovereign would be as abſolute, and might be more tyrannical than the Grand Signior himſelf. Such a parliament would grant him as many Spahis and Janizaries, as he thought neceſſary for keeping his ſlaves in ſubjection, would give him any revenue he pleaſed to demand, and would paſs whatever laws he might pleaſe to propoſe; and the judges, being under no parliamentary reſtraint, would, in every part of his dominions, give judgment according to the directions of the prime vizir, or governing baſhaw. Thus oppreſſion would be countenanced by the forms of law, and the people plundered,*

plundered, the innocent murdered, by the adminiſtration of juſtice.

" It is this ſort of ruin, Sir, we have chiefly to apprehend, and this ſort of ruin we may, ſtep by ſtep, be led into, without our being ſenſible of the ſeveral ſteps. We ſhall *certainly* be led into it, if we truſt, *any longer*, the guardianſhip of our liberties to thoſe, whoſe foreſight is blunted by the places they enjoy or expect. If a miniſter were to propoſe a law for giving the crown a power of ſending to every county, city, and borough in the kingdom, ſuch a *Conge d'Elire* for the choice of members of parliament, as is now ſent to a dean and chapter, for the choice of a biſhop, I believe, very few gentlemen of family or fortune would, for the ſake of any place, agree to it; but an equivalent power may be got by multiplying penal laws, and increaſing the number and power of officers; and a gentleman of family, fortune, character, and intereſt in his country, may, by a good place, be induced to believe, that ſuch a law, or ſuch an increaſe of the number and power of officers, is neceſſary for preventing fraudulent practices, or the like; and may, therefore, agree to it, without ſeeing the danger our conſtitution may be thereby expoſed to: Thus by degrees he may be made to agree to ſuch propoſitions, one after another, till he has thereby eſtabliſhed in the crown, the abſolute direction of moſt of the elections in the kingdom.

" This, Sir, would have been the certain conſequence of the late exciſe ſcheme; and yet there were many gentlemen of family and fortune that approved of it. I am convinced they did not foreſee this conſequence. Nay, I have ſo much charity as to believe, that the chief patron of that ſcheme did not foreſee this conſequence; but every impartial man in the kingdom is now, I believe,

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ſenſible of it. That ſcheme was, indeed, ſuch a large ſtep towards giving the crown the direction of moſt of our elections, and by good luck, was ſo thoroughly conſidered, before it was brought into this houſe, that moſt gentlemen became ſenſible of the danger, before it was too late; and this was the cauſe of its meeting with the fate it deſerved; but its fate will be a warning to future miniſters, not to attempt making ſuch a large ſtep at once: they will from thence ſee, that they muſt graſp at this power by little and little, which they will certainly do, and as certainly, at laſt, accompliſh, unleſs we take care to exclude from this houſe, moſt of thoſe who, by the places they enjoy, are induced to have a better opinion of miniſters, than any man ought to have, that is entruſted with the guardianſhip of the conſtitution and liberties of his country.

"*The queſtion is not, Sir, whether a gentleman may be induced, by the office or place he holds or expects, to make at once, and in an open and direct manner, an abſolute ſurrender of the liberties of his country: no prince or miniſter of common-ſenſe, will ever deſire ſuch a ſurrender; becauſe, if he can get into his hands, an uncontroulable power over moſt of our elections, and, conſequently, the direction of the parliaments choſen by this uncontroulable power, his power will, in every reſpect, be as abſolute, and may be exerciſed in a more arbitrary manner, and with greater ſecurity to himſelf, than it could be, without the appearance of a parliamentary authority; for every unpopular and oppreſſive meaſure would then be made the act and deed of the parliament, and the lenity of the miniſter in the execution of thoſe penal laws enacted by parliament, or in the exerciſe of thoſe powers granted him by parliament, would be ſet forth and extolled by his tools in a Gazetteer, or ſome ſuch paper, publiſhed by his authority, and*

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diſperſed through the whole kingdom at the public expence. The queſtion, therefore, now before us is, Whether a gentleman's eyes may not, by a lucrative and honourable poſt or employment, be ſo overclouded, as to prevent his ſeeing through the plauſible pretences, that may, from time to time, be made uſe of, by an artful miniſter, for getting into his hands, or into the hands of the crown, ſuch an uncontroulable power, as I have mentioned; and this queſtion, even with reſpect to gentlemen of family and fortune, will, I am ſure, be anſwered in the affirmative, by every man in the kingdom, who does not poſſeſs or expect ſome poſt, or employment, or ſome of thoſe titles of honour, which, by our conſtitution, as it is now modelled, the crown has abſolutely at its diſpoſal.

" To tell us, Sir, that our liberties can never be in danger from a majority of placemen in this houſe, unleſs the people be generally abandoned, as to all principles of virtue and public good, and unleſs the crown has, at the ſame time, formed deſigns againſt our liberties; and that the only method for removing this danger, in caſe we ſhould, at any time, be threatned with it, would be to take proper meaſures for reſtoring virtue, and public ſpirit among the people, and for removing evil counſellors from about the throne: to tell us this, I ſay, Sir, in a ſerious manner, is ſomething very extraordinary: it is miſtaking the effect for the cauſe, and deſiring us to begin at the wrong end. Corruption, Sir, is not the effect, but the cauſe of a general depravity of manners among the people of any country, and has in all countries, as well as this, been firſt *practiſed* and *encouraged* by *miniſters* and *courtiers.* It would, therefore, be ridiculous in us, to think of reſtoring virtue among the people, till we have once made it impoſſible for miniſters and courtiers

to corrupt them; and, I am ſure, would be ſtill more ridiculous in us, *to think of removing an evil counſellor from about the throne, till we have once removed his creatures and tools out of this houſe.*"

Sir William Wyndham.

SIR,

" The honourable gentleman who ſpoke laſt has told us, that queſtions in politics admit of no demonſtration. In this I am entirely of his opinion, and, I think, this opinion was never more ſtrongly confirmed, than by the debate of this day. There never was a queſtion in this houſe, that could be brought nearer to a demonſtration, than the queſtion now before us; and yet, I find, it is not poſſible to convince thoſe that may be affected by its being agreed to. It has hitherto been reckoned a maxim in law, which I never before heard diſputed, that parties ought not to be judges; but now I find this maxim denied, and, indeed, it muſt be ſo, by every gentleman that ſays, our conſtitution can never ſuffer by a majority of placemen in this houſe; for that placemen and officers of all kinds muſt be parties concerned in many caſes, which we, as members of this houſe, muſt judge of, is ſo clear, that I ſhould have been aſhamed to have given you the trouble of proving it, if I had not heard the motion now before you ſo warmly oppoſed.

" Upon this occaſion, Sir, I muſt obſerve, that all free governments muſt conſiſt of two diſtinct powers, the legiſlative, and the executive; the laſt of which is always ſubordinate, and ſubject to the review of the firſt. *The very eſſence of a free government conſiſts, among other things, in this, that all thoſe who are entruſted with the executive power, ſhall*

be accountable for their conduct to the legiſlative power, and may be puniſhed by the legiſlative power, which always conſiſts in ſome ſort of an aſſembly of the people, in caſe it be found that they have neglected or tranſgreſſed their duty in the execution of their office; for what benefit could the people reap from their having the power of making their own laws, if thoſe who are entruſted with the executive power of the ſociety, might, without fear or controul, betray or neglect the public affairs of the ſociety, or injure and oppreſs individuals, either by neglecting to execute the laws, or by executing them in a different manner from what was intended, or by pretending to act according to law, without having any law for their authority?

" This, I ſay, Sir, is eſſential to every free government, and, accordingly, we have this regulation eſtabliſhed by our frame of government in the moſt perfect manner. Thoſe who are entruſted with the executive power, are all, or moſt of them, named by the King; but then every one of them, from the higheſt to the loweſt, is accountable to, and may be puniſhed by, the two houſes of parliament; and it is particularly the buſineſs of this houſe, which is the grand inqueſt of the nation, to enquire into their conduct, and to impeach thoſe we find guilty of any neglect or miſdemeanor, in the exerciſe of that part of the executive power which is entruſted to them by the crown. *Therefore, it is our duty to make frequent enquiries into the conduct of every miniſter, officer, and placeman appointed by the crown; and upon all ſuch enquiries, we are to examine ſtrictly into their behaviour, and judge impartially of their conduct.* From hence it appears, that in all ſuch enquiries, and in all queſtions relating to them, the members of this houſe, as ſuch, are judges of the conduct and behaviour of every placeman, officer, or miniſter employed by the crown in the

the executive part of our government; and, conſequently, every placeman, officer, and miniſter, that has a ſeat in this aſſembly, muſt be both judge and party in many caſes that ought to be brought before us.

"It ſignifies nothing to ſay, Sir, that no officer can be a party concerned in the conduct of another officer, and that an officer who happens to be a member of this houſe, muſt retire, as ſoon as any queſtion ariſes relating to his own conduct; for as there are many and great connections between different offices, and between officers of different offices, which may at firſt view appear entirely diſtinct, it is impoſſible ſo much as to gueſs when an enquiry, or any leading queſtion to an enquiry, into the conduct of one office or officer is moved for; I ſay it is impoſſible to gueſs what other officers may, upon the event of a ſtrict enquiry, appear to have been confederates with him in his crimes. Nay, even thoſe officers that never had any dealings with him, cannot know but that a cloſe enquiry into one office, may bring to light, as it often does, ſome mal-practices of other offices, in which they themſelves have a concern: and therefore, every officer in the houſe will think himſelf a party concerned in every enquiry that can be ſet on foot, and will, conſequently, endeavour to prevent or defeat every ſuch enquiry. To this I muſt add, that in all degrees and ſtations of life, men of the ſame trade, employment, or profeſſion, eſpecially where their buſineſs does not interfere, conceive an affection for one another, and are therefore apt to judge very partially in one another's favour; from whence it muſt be concluded, that, in every ſuch enquiry, and every queſtion that ariſes relating to any ſuch, all miniſters, placemen, and officers, are parties concerned, not only in intereſt, but affection; and

conſequently, all thoſe who have ſeats in this houſe, muſt, in all ſuch caſes, be both judges and parties, which is directly contrary to the eſtabliſhed maxim I have mentioned.

" Whether it be owing to the great number of placemen and officers we have had for many years in this houſe, or whether it be owing to the integrity of thoſe who have of late years been concerned in the executive part of our government, I do not know; but I muſt obſerve, that parliamentary enquiries into the management of offices, and conduct of officers appointed by the crown, have, of late years, been very rare; and yet, in order to keep all ſuch officers to their good behaviour, I muſt be of opinion, that ſuch enquiries ought to be frequently ſet on foot, and ſtrictly carried on, tho' no direct complaint has been made againſt any one particular officer; for a public rumour is a ſufficient ground for a parliamentary enquiry, and no man can ſay, that ſuch grounds have been wanting. But whatever may be the cauſe of our having lately had ſo few parliamentary enquiries, I will be bold to propheſy, that, if there ſhould ever be a majority of placemen and officers in this houſe, we ſhall never afterwards have any more ſuch enquiries, unleſs they be ſuch as are ſet up at the inſtigation, and by the contrivance of miniſters, in order to gain a little popularity, by throwing a ſcape goat among the people. And if this ſhould ever come to be our caſe, I am ſure no man could, with juſtice, ſay that we lived under a free government, or that our conſtitution remained entire.

" Thus, I think, Sir, the queſtion now before us is brought as near a demonſtration as any ſuch queſtion can poſſibly be. As members of this houſe, we are to enquire into, and judge of the conduct of miniſters, officers, and placemen, entruſted by the

crown

crown with the executive power of our government: as miniſters, officers, and placemen, named by the crown, we are the perſons whoſe conduct is to be enquired into. Is it not evident then, that theſe two characters are incompatible, unleſs we ſay, that parties may be judges? Sir, it is ſo evident, *that I ſhould be for excluding every miniſter, officer, and placeman, from having a ſeat in this houſe, were it not for the neceſſity we are under of having ſome of the chief amongſt us, in order to give us proper information with reſpect to the great offices they are at the head of?* If this queſtion admits of a variety of opinions, I am ſure every queſtion in politics muſt, and therefore, great care ſhould be taken, that thoſe who are to judge of ſuch queſtions, ſhall not be under the leaſt biaſs; for the weight and efficacy of the biaſs will always increaſe, in proportion to the doubtfulneſs of the queſtion; which is a new argument againſt admitting placemen and officers into this houſe.

" We have been told, Sir, that it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe, that gentlemen of great fortune and intereſt in the country will ſacrifice the liberties of their country for the ſake of a place they enjoy or expect. Sir, it is ſo far from being impoſſible to ſuppoſe this, that it is a common caſe. It has always been the caſe in every country where the liberties of the people have been ſacrificed. The liberties of no country can be ſacrificed, without the concurrence of many gentlemen of family, fortune and intereſt, and a criminal indolence or paſſivity in the reſt. Some are led, contrary to the light of their own underſtandings, by their avarice, vanity, luxury, or extravagance; others are deceived by ſpecious pretences, and led into ſuch meaſures, the certain, though not the plain and direct conſequences of which, are ſlavery and arbitrary power. With the firſt ſort of men, an honourable and profitable place affords them an immediate ſatisfaction

for

for their avarice, or vanity, or an immediate ſupply for their luxury or extravagance, which they prefer to all other conſiderations. With the ſecond ſort of men, an honourable and profitable place gives them a biaſs to that ſide of the queſtion upon which their place depends, and prevents their ſeeing through the ſpecious pretences that are made uſe of for ſupporting that ſide of the queſtion. And thus, between theſe two ſorts of men, the liberties of any country may probably be given up, if they are committed to the keeping of thoſe that have honourable and profitable places, which depend upon their making the ſurrender.

"Let us conſider, Sir, that even liberty itſelf is but a queſtion in politics. Whether a limited or an abſolute monarchy be the beſt ſort of government is but a queſtion in politics; and therefore, as the honourable gentleman has ſaid, can admit of no demonſtration. For this reaſon, even thoſe that are gentlemen of fortune and intereſt in their country, if they be in the leaſt governed by avarice, vanity, luxury, or extravagance, may, by an honourable and profitable employment, be induced not only to ſay and vote, but even to think, that an abſolute monarchy is the beſt ſort of government, and that they do a ſignal ſervice to their country, by ſacrificing its liberties. *Nay, this very doctrine has of late been ſupported in private company, and by gentlemen of very great diſtinction.* How natural then is it to ſuppoſe, that in political queſtions, where our liberties are not directly and immediately, but indirectly and conſequentially concerned, a gentleman of diſtinction may be induced by an honourable and profitable employment, to approve of, or give his aſſent to the wrong ſide of the queſtion? How natural is it to ſuppoſe, that the members of this houſe may, by ſuch means, be induced to grant ſuch revenues, ſuch a number of troops, and ſuch

powers

powers and prerogatives to the crown, as may, for ever after, put it out of the power of parliament to controul any of the King's meaſures, or to puniſh any of his officers, unleſs they be ſuch as he may be pleaſed to throw out of his protection; and in this caſe, whatever forms of liberty we might have, I am ſure it would be ridiculous to ſay we had any of the ſubſtance remaining.

" *Thus, Sir, I think, it is evident almoſt to a demonſtration, that our conſtitution and liberties not only may, but muſt be deſtroyed, unleſs we ſhut the doors of this houſe againſt moſt placemen and officers, as we have already done againſt all penſioners; and as this is ſo evident, no objection that can be invented, no danger, no terror, we can be frightened with, ſhall prevent me from exerting all the power I have from its being done. Slavery to me is the higheſt of all terrors, and therefore I ſhall be for guarding againſt it at the riſk of any other terror that can be imagined.* But I muſt ſay, that, in this long debate, I have not heard one plauſible objection made againſt this excluſion. To tell us that a juſt and wiſe adminiſtration can have no friends of good fortune and intereſt in their ſeveral countries, but ſuch as have places or offices under the crown, is ſomething very ſurprizing. If this were the caſe, I am ſure it muſt be granted, that the places and offices under the crown are now become infinitely too numerous. But this, Sir, is not, nor ever can be the caſe. There are now in every county in England, one with another, two or three hundred gentlemen of family, fortune and intereſt in their ſeveral counties, who have no places or offices under the crown, and who, under a juſt and wiſe adminiſtration, would be firm friends to it, and would be able to ſupport it, in a legal way, againſt all the Jacobites, republicans, and diſcontented, that could, in ſuch a caſe, be within the kingdom;

dom; and, among ſuch a number, could not the adminiſtration find one or two to ſtand as candidates upon their intereſt at every election within the county? They certainly might, and their candidates would have this advantage, that they would have the votes and intereſt of all thoſe gentlemen of fortune within the county, who had places or offices under the crown, and could not therefore, themſelves, ſtand as candidates at any election. Therefore, ſhould this bill paſs into a law, no future adminiſtration would be under the neceſſity of employing any but men of low or deſperate fortunes in any place or office under the crown; and, I am ſure, no juſt or wiſe adminiſtration will ever chuſe it.

"It has been ſaid, Sir, that we ought not to make any alteration in our conſtitution without an apparent neceſſity; and that the alteration propoſed by this bill cannot appear neceſſary, unleſs we ſuppoſe ſuch a venal and abandoned ſpirit to prevail in the nation, that moſt gentlemen of family and fortune amongſt us, would be ready to ſacrifice the liberties of their country, rather than riſk loſing a good poſt or employment under the crown. Sir, it is to prevent the growth of ſuch a venal and abandoned ſpirit, that this bill is intended. When the crown had but few lucrative poſts to beſtow, the moſt abandoned adminiſtration could not contribute much to the growth of this ſpirit; but the crown has now ſuch a number of lucrative poſts to beſtow, that, if theſe poſts ſhould be applied to the purchaſe of a gentleman's vote in this houſe, or his intereſt at elections, ſuch a ſpirit would ſoon prevail, and at laſt become univerſal. It would begin in this houſe: it would grow by example: one gentleman's being corrupted would not only be an example, but it would give countenance to a ſecond;

cond; he to a third, and ſo forth, till at laſt it would ſpread through the majority of this houſe. From this houſe it would deſcend to elections; for he that ſells will purchaſe, if he can otherwiſe have nothing to ſell. Begin, Sir, at the fountain: clear that from corruption, and the ſtream will ſoon run clear; *for if members cannot ſell votes in parliament, they will never, or very ſeldom, buy that commodity at elections.* Their vanity may ſometimes prompt them to do ſo, but this can happen but ſeldom, and can never have any great effect.

"I ſhall not ſay, Sir, that placemen have ever approved or oppoſed queſtions in this houſe, becauſe they were placemen; and for no other reaſon; but this I will ſay, *that the majority of the nation think they have often done ſo; and I muſt obſerve, that ever ſince I ſat in parliament, our placemen have generally been of the ſame ſide with our miniſters: if any of them dropt by chance into the other ſide of the queſtion, they have of late years ſoon ceaſed to be placemen. Nay, even in this houſe, we have heard it delivered as a miniſterial maxim, that no man ought to be allowed to keep his place under the crown, if he follows the directions of his conſcience, and votes againſt any of the miniſter's meaſures or jobbs in parliament.* This makes me think the bill the more neceſſary: the whole nation thinks ſo; and if this queſtion ſhould paſs in the negative, the whole nation will think the bill more neceſſary than they ever thought it before. They will think it abſolutely neceſſary to have ſuch a bill, but now not poſſible to obtain it; which will of courſe raiſe ſuch a diſcontent, or perhaps diſaffection, in the nation, as may be of dangerous conſequence to the preſent eſtabliſhment.

"It is really, Sir, moſt aſtoniſhing to hear it ſaid, that the adminiſtration's intereſt in the ſeveral little boroughs upon our coaſt, depends upon the

natural intereſt of thoſe that have places under the crown. This, I ſay, is moſt aſtoniſhing, conſidering how notoriouſly it is known to be otherwiſe. I ſhall grant, that if the intereſt made in the little boroughs, by cuſtom-houſe-officers, exciſemen, officers of dock-yards, and ſuch like gentlemen, be a natural intereſt, a clerk of the Treaſury or Admiralty may be ſaid to have a great natural intereſt in his borough; but as this intereſt depends upon his poſt, and not upon his family or fortune, I cannot call it a natural intereſt. Do not we know, Sir, that many of our little boroughs are already become ſo venal, ſo publicly venal, that their brokers, or rather their pimps, deal as openly for the ſale of them, as bawds do for the ſale of a proſtitute. This infamous traffic I am for putting an end to; and as the bill now propoſed will be of great ſervice for this purpoſe, I ſhall be not only for bringing it in, but for having it paſſed into a law.

"After nine hours debate, the queſtion was put, and paſſed in the negative; Ayes 206, Noes 222."

A LIST

A LIST OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WITH The PLACES which the Majority of them enjoy.

N. B. *Thoſe marked thus* * *are Members who voted for Mr. Wilkes's Expulſion.—Thoſe marked* § *in the Middleſex Election, in Favour of Col. Luttrell.—Thoſe marked* † *for the Commitment of the Lord Mayor to the Tower.*

A.

ABDY, Sir Anth. *Knareſborough*—King's Counſel.
A'Court, Lt. Gen. Wm. *Heyteſbury, Wilts*—Clerk of the Works in Chelſea Hoſpital.
§ * † Adam, Robert, *Kinroſſhire*—Architect to the King.
Adams, George, *Litchfield.*
§ * † Aiſlabie, Wm. *Rippon, Yorkſh.*—Auditor of the Impreſt, and Regiſter of the Conſiſtory Court of York.
§ * Allanſon, Charles, *Rippon*—Son-in-law to the former Member.
Allen, Benjamin, *Bridgewater.*
† Ambler, Charles, *Bramber*—King's Counſel, and Solicitor General to the Queen.
§ * † Amcotts, Charles, *Boſton*—Lieut. Col. of Militia.
§ * Amherſt, Wm. *Launceſton*—Colonel in the Army, and Aid de Camp to the King.
Anderſon, Charles, *Beverly.*
§ * † Anſtruther, Sir John, *Anſtruther* in *Scotland.*
§ * † Aſhburnham, Wm. *Haſtings*—Deputy Keeper of the Great Wardrobe.
Aſtley, Sir John, *Salop* County.
Aſtley, Sir Edward, *Norfolk.*
Aubrey, John, *Wallingford.*
Aufrere, George, *Stamford.*

B.

§ * Bacon, Edward, *Norwich*—Chairman of Elections.
§ * † Bacon, Anth. *Aylesbury*—Contractor for Stores, African and Weſt-Indian Affairs.
§ * † Bagot, Sir Wm. *Staffordſhire*—His Brother a Commiſſioner of Exciſe.
Baker, William, *Plympton, Devonſhire.*
§ * Baldwyn, Charles, *Salop* County—Brought in by Lord Gower.
Bamfylde, Sir Richard, *Devonſhire*—Lieut. Col. of the Devonſhire Militia.
Barne, Miles, *Dunwich.*
Barré, Iſaac, *Wycomb*—Lieut. Col. in the Army.
§ * † Barrington, Viſcount, *Plymouth*—Secretary at War.
Barrington, Sir John, *Newton, Hants.*
Barrow, Charles, *Glouceſter.*
§ * † Bateman, Viſc. *Leominſter*—Maſter of the Buck Hounds.
Bayley, Nathaniel, *Abingdon.*
Bayley, Sir Nich. *Angleſea*—Lieut. and Cuſtos Rot. of *Angleſea.*
§ * † Bayntun, Sir Edward, *Chippenham*—Surveyor of the Duchy of Cornwall.
§ * † Beauchamp, Viſcount, *Orford*—Son to Lord Hertford, Chamberlain to the King, and quartered in Ireland. Vide Journals of the Lords in Ireland.
Beauclerk, Aubrey, *Aldborough.*
Beckford, Peter, *Morpeth.*
* Bellaſyſe, Lord, *Peterborough.*
Bennet, K. H. A. *Newport, Cornwall.*
Bentinck, Lord Edward, *Carliſle.*
Bernard, Sir Robert, *Weſtminſter.*
Bertie, Lord Brownlow, *Lincolnſhire.*
Bertie, Ld. Robert, *Boſton, Lincolnſh.*—Lieut. Gen. Col. of Foot, Gov. of Duncannon, and Lord of the Bedchamber.
Bertie, Peregrine, *Weſtbury*—Captain in the Navy.
Bethel, Hugh, *Beverly.*
† Blackett, Sir Walter, *Newcaſtle upon Tyne.*
§ * Blackett, Sir Edward, *Northumberland.*
† Blake, Patrick, *Sudbury.*
Bond, John, *Corfe Caſtle.*
† Boon, Charles, *Aſhburton.*
Bootle, Richard Wilbraham, City of *Cheſter.*
§ * † Boſcawen, Lieut. Gen. *Truro*—Governor of Sicily.
§ * Boſcawen, Edward, Ditto—Nephew to Lord Falmouth, and Captain of the Band of Gentlemen Penſioners.

Boſcawen,

§ * Boſcawen, Geo. jun. *St. Mawes*—Lieut. of Horſe Grenadiers.
Boulton, Henry Crabb, *Worceſter* City.
§ * † Bradſhaw, Thomas, *Saltaſh*—Late Secretary of the Treaſury; now a Penſioner.
Brett, Sir Piercy, *Queenborough, Kent*—Admiral of the White.
Brett, Charles, *Leſtwithiel.*
Brickdale, Matthew, *Briſtol.*
Bridgeman, Sir Henry, *Wenlock.*
Bridges, Sir Brooke, *Kent.*
§ * † Brudenell, Hon. James, *Marlborough*—Maſter of the Robes to the King.
§ † Brudenell, Geo. Bridges, *Rutlandſh.*—Clerk Comptroller of his Majeſty's Houſehold.
§ * † Bull, Richard, *Newport, Cornwall*—Lord Warden of the Stanaries, and Steward of Cornwall.
Buller, John, junior, *Exeter.*
§ * † Buller, John, ſenior, *Eaſtlooe, Cornwall*—Lord of the Admiralty, and Comptroller of the Mint.
Bullock, John, *Malden*—Lieut. Col. of the Eſſex Militia.
Bullock, Joſeph, *Wendover.*
Banbury, Sir Charles, *Suffolk*—Major of Militia.
§ * † Burgoyne, John, *Preſton*—a Colonel of Dragoons, and Governor of Fort William.
Burke, Edmund, *Wendover.*
Burke, William, *Bedwin.*
† Byrne, Michael. *St. Mawes.*
§ * † Burrard, Sir Harry, *Lymington*—Ranger of New Foreſt, and Governor of Calſhot Caſtle.
§ * † Burrell, Peter, *Totneſs*—Surv. Gen. of the Crown Lands.
§ * † Burrell, Dr. Wm. *Haſſelmere*—Chancellor of Worceſter.
Byng, George, *Wigan.*

C.

§ * † Cadogan, Charles Sloan, *Cambridge* Town——Maſter-worker of the Mint.
Calcraft, Thomas, *Poole*—Lieut. Col. in the Army.
Calcraft, John, *Rocheſter.*
Calvert, Nicholſon, *Tewkeſbury.*
Calvert, John, *Hertford.*
§ * † Campbell, Ld. Fred. *Rutherglen, &c.*—Lord Regiſter of Scotland.
§ * † Campbell, Robert, *Argyleſhire*—Lieut. Col. and Receiver General of the Cuſtoms in Scotland.
Carnac, John, *Leominſter.*
Caſwell, Timothy, *Brackley*—Dep. Pay-maſter General.

Catherlough,

† Catherlough, Earl of, *Milbourn Port.*
Cave, Sir Thomas, *Leiceſterſhire.*
Cavendiſh, Lord Geo. *Derbyſhire*—Lieut. and Cuſtos Rot.
Cavendiſh, Ld. Fred. Town of *Derby*—Lieut. Gen. and Colonel of the 34th Regiment.
Cavendiſh, Lord John, *York.*
Cavendiſh, Henry, *Leſtwithiel.*
Child, Robert, *Wells.*
Cholmley, Nathaniel, *Boroughbridge.*
§ * † Clanbraſſil, Earl of, *Halſton*—Chief Remembrancer of the Exchequer in Ireland.
§ * † Clare, Ld. Viſc. *Briſtol*—Vice Treaſurer of Ireland.
Clerk, Godfrey, *Bagnel.*
† Clavering, Sir Thomas, *Durham* County.
Clayton, Sir Robert, *Blechingly.*
§ * † Clayton, William, *Great Marlow.*
Cleveland, John, *Barnſtable*——Accountant to the Six-penny Receiver's Office.
Clive, Lord, *Shrewſbury.*
Cocks, Charles, *Ryegate*—Clerk of the Ordnance.
Clive, George, *Biſhop's Caſtle.*
Coddrington, Sir Wm. *Tewkeſbury*—Lieut. Colonel of Glouceſter of Militia.
Colebrooke, Sir Geo. *Arundel*—Remembrancer of the firſt Fruits, and Chirographer of the Court of Com. Pleas.
Congreve, Ralph, *Cardigan* Town.
Conolly, Rt. Hon. Tho. *Chicheſter*—A Privy Counſellor in Ireland,
§ * † Conway, Rt. Hon. H. S. *Thetford*—Lt. Gen. of Ordnance, Chamberlain to the King, and Conſtable of Dublin Caſtle for Life.
† Conway, Hon. Henry Seymour, *Coventry.*
Conway, Hon. Rich. Seymour, *Orford.*
† Conyngham, Viſc. *Sandwich*—Vice Admiral of Halſter.
§ * † Cooper, Grey, *Grampound*—Secretary to the Treaſury.
Coote, Sir Eyre, *Leiceſter*—Colonel of Foot.
Cornewall, Tho. *Montgomery*—a Captain in the Navy.
Cornwall, Charles Wooll. *Grampound.*
Cornwallis, Wm. *Eye*—a Captain in the Navy.
§ * † Cotton, Sir John Hynde, *Cambridgeſhire.*
§ * † Cotton, Sir Lynch, *Derbyſhire*—Receiver General of the King's Quit-rents in North Wales.
Coventry, Thomas, *Bridport.*
Cope, Hyp. Richard, *Somerſetſhire.*
§ * Craven, Thomas, *Berkſhire.*—Rear Admiral of the Blue.
§ * † Crawford, John, *Old Sarum.*

Creſwell,

§ * † Creſwell, Thomas Eſtcourt, *Wotton-baſſet*—Purveyor of Chelſea Hoſpital.
Creſwell, Eſtcourt, *Cirenceſter.*
Crewe, John, *Cheſhire.*
* Crofts, Richard, *Cambridge Univerſity.*
Croſby, Braſs, *Honiton.*
Crowle, Charles, *Richmond,*
Curzon, Aſheton, *Clitheroe.*
Curwen, Henry, *Cumberland*—* Major of Cumberland Militia.
§ * † Cuſt, Peregrine, *Shoreham*—A Contractor and Director of Greenwich Hoſpital.
§ * † Cuſt, Sir Brownlowe, *Ivelcheſter.*
† Cuſt, Francis, *Grantham*—Counſel to the Admiralty and Navy, and Univerſity of Cambridge.

D.

Damer, Hon. John, *Gatton.*
Damer, John, *Dorcheſter.*
Damer, Hon. George, *Cricklade.*
Davers, Sir Charles, *Weymouth.*
Dawkins, Henry, *Chippenham.*
Dempſter, George, *Dundee*, &c.—Secretary to the Order of the Thiſtle for Life.
* † De Grey, Tho. *Norfolk County.*—Lieut. Col. of Militia.
Delaval, George, *Northumberland*—Lieut. Col. of Militia.
* Delaval, Sir J. Huſſey, *Berwick upon Tweed.*
* † Dickenſon, William, *Marlow.*
§ * † Dickſon, James, *Peebles*, &c.
† Ditton, Hon. Charles, *Weſtbury.*
† Dodd, John, *Reading*—Lietenant Colonel of Militia.
* † Dolben, Sir William, *Northamptonſhire.*
Donnegal, Earl, *Malmſbury.*
§ * † Douglas, William, *Kircudbright.*
§ † Douglas, J. St. Ledger, *Hindon.*
§ * † Douglas, Archibald, *Dumfrieſſhire*—a Col. of Dragoons, and Lieut. General.
Dowdeſwell, Right Hon. William, *Worceſterſhire.*
Down, Lord Viſcount, *Malton.*
Drake, Francis William, *Beeralſton.*
* Drake, William, ſen. *Agmondeſham*—a Col. of Militia.
* Drake, William, jun. Ditto.
§ * † Drummond, Adam, *St. Ives*—Contractor for the Troops in America.
§ * † Drummond, J. *Thetford*—Gentleman of the King's Privy Chamber.
Dummer, Thomas, *Yarmouth, Iſle of Wight.*

Duncomb,

Duncomb, Thomas, *Downton*—Col. of Militia.
§ * † Dundas, Sir Lawrence, *Edinburgh* — Vice Admiral of Shetland and Orkneys.
§ * † Dundas, Thomas, jun. *Orkney*, &c.
§ * † Dundas, Thomas, *Stirlingſhire.*
† Dundas, James, *Linlithgowſhire.*
Dunning, John, *Calne.*
Duntze, John, *Tiverton.*
§ * † Durand, John, *Ayleſbury*—Contractor for Maſts.
* Durant, George, *Eveſham*—was Paymaſter of the Forces abroad.
Durant, Thomas, *St. Ives.*
§ * † Dyſon, Jeremiah, *Weymouth*, &c.—Lord of the Treaſury, and Penſioner extraordinary. Vide Commons Journals of Ireland.

E.

Eames, John, *Newport, Hants.*—Maſter in Chancery.
§ * † Edmonſton, Arch. *Dumbartonſhire*—Commiſ. of Paving.
Edwards, William, *Haverford Weſt.*
Egerton, Samuel, *Cheſhire.*
§ * † Egerton, William, *Brackley*—Captain of Horſe Guards, Gentleman Uſher to the Princeſs Dowager of Wales, and Yeoman of the Jewel Office.
Elliot, Edward, *Leſkard*—Commiſſioner of Trade, and Receiver General of the Duchy of Cornwall.
§ * † Elliot, Sir Gilbert, *Rockſburghſhire* — Treaſurer of the Navy, Keeper of the Signet, &c.
§ * † Ellis, Welbore, *Petersfield*—Vice Treaſurer of Ireland.
§ * Evelyn, William, *Helſton, Corn.*—Major Gen. and Col.
Evelyn, William, *Hythe.*
§ * Ewer, William, *Dorcheſter*—Treaſ. of the Levant Comp.

F.

§ * Fane, Henry, *Lyme Regis.*
† Farnaby, Sir Charles, *Kent.*
Featherſtone, Sir Matthew, *Portſmouth.*
§ * Fellows, William, *Ludlow.*
Fenwick, Thomas, *Weſtmoreland.*
Field, Paul, *Hertford.*
* Fife, Earl of, *Bamffſhire.*
§ * Filmer, Sir John, *Steyning.*
Finch, Savile, *Malton.*
Fitzmaurice, Thomas, *Calne.*
† Fitzpatrick, Hon. Rich. *Oakhampton* — Enſign in the Guards.
§ * † Fitzroy, Hon. Col. *Edmundſbury*—Vice Chamberlain to the Queen, and Col. of Dragoons.

Fletcher,

† Fletcher, Sir Robert, *Cricklade.*
Fletcher, Henry, *Cumberland.*
Foley, Thomas, ſenior, *Herefordſhire.*
Foley, Thomas, junior, *Herefordſhire.*
Foley, Edward, *Droitwich.*
Folkſton, Viſcount, *New Sarum.*
§ * † Fonnereau, Zac. Phil. *Aldborough*—Contractor for Proviſions for Minorca and Gibraltar.
* Forreſter, Alexander, *Newcaſtle under Line.*
Forreſter, George, *Wenlock.*
Fortroſe, Lord, *Bute, &c.*
§ * † Fox, Hon. Stephen, *Sarum.*
† Fox, Hon. Charles, *Midhurſt*—Lord of the Admiralty.
Frankland, Sir Tho. *Thirſk*—Admiral of the Blue.
Frankland, William, Ditto.
† Fraſer, Simon, *Inverneſſſhire*—Colonel in the Army.
§ * † Frederick, Sir Charles, *Queenborough*—Surveyor General of the Ordnance, &c. &c. &c.
Freeman, Samb. *Bridport.*
§ * Freeman, Tho. Edw. *Steyning*—Gent. of Privy-chamber.
* † Fuller, Roſe, *Rye.*
Fuller, Richard, *Stockbridge.*

G.

† Gage, Ld. Viſc. *Seaford*—Paymaſter of the Penſions.
Galway, Viſc. *Pontefract*—Receiver of the Crown and Fee-farm Rents of Durham and Northumberland.
§ * † Garden, Alexander. *Aberdeenſhire.*
§ * † Garlies, Lord, *Luggerſhall.*
Garth, Charles, *Devizes.*
† Gaſcoyne, Bamber, *Weobly*—Steward of Marſhalſ. Court.
Germain, Lord George, *Eaſt Grinſtead.*
† Gideon, Sir Sampſon, *Cambridgeſhire.*
§ * † Gilbert, Tho. *Litchfield*—Comptroller of the Wardrobe.
§ † Gilmour, Sir Alex. *Edinburghſh.*—Clerk of the Board of Green Cloth.
§ * † Glyn, Sir Richard, *Coventry.*
Glynn, John, *Middleſex.*
§ * Glynne, Sir John, *Flint* Town—Captain of Militia.
§ * Gordon, Hon. Wm. *Woodſtock*—Lieut. Col. in the Army.
§ * † Græme, Major Gen. *Perthſhire*—Secretary to the Queen, and Colonel of 49th Regiment.
§ * † Grant, Francis, *Elginſh.*—M. Gen. and Col. in the Army.
Graves, Wm. *Weſtlow*—Maſter in Chancery.
Grey, Charles, *Colcheſter.*
Gregory, Robert, *Maidſtone.*
Grenville, Hon. Henry, Ditto.

Grenville, James, junior, *Buckingham.*
§ * † Greville, Lord, *Warwick*—Commiſſioner of Trade.
§ * † Grey, Hon. John, *Tregony.*
Grey, Hon. Booth, *Leiceſter.*
Griffin, Sir J. Griffin, *Andover*—Lt. Gen. and Col. in the Guards.
Groſvenor, Thomas, *Cheſter.*
Grove, Wm. Chaffin, *Shafteſbury.*
Guiſe, Sir William, *Glouceſterſhire.*

H.

† Hales, Sir Thomas P. *Dover.*
Halſey, Thomas, *Hertfordſhire.*
Hampden, Hon. Thomas, *Lewes.*
§ * Hamilton, Lord Archibald, *Lancaſhire.*
Hamilton, Wm. Gerrard, *Old Sarum*—Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ireland.
Hanbury, John, *Monmouthſhire.*
§ * † Hanmer, Walden, *Sudbury.*
Harbord, Sir Harbord, *Norwich.*
§ * Harcourt, Wm. *Oxford* City—Lieut. Col. and Groom of the Bed-chamber.
Harcourt, Richard, *Suſſex.*
Hardy, Sir Charles, *Plymouth*——Admiral of the Blue, Maſter and Director of Greenwich Hoſpital.
§ * † Harley, Robert, *Droitwich.*
* Harley, Rt. Hon. Tho. *London*—Contractor for clothing the Army and Invalids.
Harris, James, ſenior, *Chriſt Church,*
Harris, James, jun. D°—Miniſter to the Court of Berlin.
Hart, William Nevil, *Stafford.*
§ * † Hervey, Edward, *Harwich*—Adjutant Gen. and Colonel of 3d Regiment of Horſe.
§ * Hawke, Sir Edward, *Portſmouth.*
§ * Hawke, M. Bladen, *Saltaſh.*
† Hay, Dr. Geo. *Newcaſtle under Line*—Dean of the Arches, and Judge of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury.
Hay, Thomas, *Lewes.*
Hayes, James, *Downton*—a Welch Judge.
§ * † Hepburne, Robert, *Kincardineſhire.*
† Herbert, Henry, *Wilton*—Secretary of Jamaica.
§ * Herbert, Hon. Nich. Ditto.
Herbert, Thomas, *Ludlow.*
† Hervey, Rt. Hon. Aug. *St. Edmundſbury*—Groom of the Bed-chamber, Ld. of the Adm. and Col. of Marines.
Hewett, John, *Nottinghamſhire.*
Haywood, James, *Fowey.*

Hill,

§ Hill, Noel, *Shrewſbury.*
§ * † Hinchinbrooke, Viſc. *Huntingdonſh.*—Vice Chamberlain to the King.
Hobart, Hon. Geo. *Beeralſton.*
Honywood, Philip, *Appleby*—Lieut. Gen. Governor of Kingſton, and Col. of Horſe.
† Hopkins, Richard, *Dartmouth*—Clerk of the Board of Green Cloth.
† Hopkins, Benjamin, *Bedwin.*
Hotham, Beaumont, *Wigan.*
† Houghton, Sir Henry, *Preſton.*
Howard, Hon. Tho. *Mulmſbury.*
* † Howard, Geo. *Stamford*—Governor of Chelſea Hoſpital, and Col. of Dragoons.
§ * How, Rich. Viſc. *Dartmouth*—Rear Admiral of the Blue.
§ * How, Hon. Wm. *Notingham*—a Col. and Lieut. Governor of the Iſle of Wight.
How, Hon. Thomas, *Northampton.*
Hunt, George, *Bodmyn.*
Huſke, John, *Malden.*
Huſſey, William, *Hindon.*

I.

* † Jackſon, Rich. *New Romney*—Counſel to S. S. Company Board of Trade, &c.
† Jenkinſon, Charles, *Appleby.*
§ * Jenkinſon, John, *Corſe Caſtle*—Gentleman Uſher to the Queen, and Captain in the Army.
Jennings, Philip, *Totneſs.*
§ * Jennings, George, *St. Germains.*
§ * † Jennings, Soame, *Cambridge* Town—a Lord of Trade.
* Johnſton, Geo. *Cockermouth*—Captain in the Navy.
† Jolliffe, William, *Petersfield.*
§ * † Jones, Robert, *Huntingdon*—Contractor for Remittances to Minorca.
§ * † Irnham, Lord, *Weobly.*
Irwin, John, *Eaſt Grinſtead*—Maj. Gen. and Col. of Foot.
Iſham, Sir Edmund, *Northamptonſh.*—Aſſeſſor to the Dep. Earl Marſhal.

K.

Keck, Anthony James, *Newton.*
Keen, Wilſhed, *Wareham.*
§ * Kennedy, David, *Airſhire.*
Keppel, Hon. Aug. *Windſor*—Vice Admiral of the Blue.
Keppel, Hon. Wm. *Chicheſter*—M. Gen. and Col. of Foot.
§ * Kynaſton, Edward, *Montgomeryſhire.*

L.

Ladbroke, Sir Robert, *London.*
Lambton, Lt. Gen. *Durham*—Lt. Gen. and Col. of Foot.
Langlois, Benj. *St. Germains*—Sec. to Embaſſy at Vienna.
† Laroche, James, *Bodmin.*
Laſcelles, Edwin, *Yorkſhire.*
Laſcelles, Daniel, *Northallerton.*
Laſcelles, Edward, Ditto.
Legh, Peter, *Newton, Lancaſhire.*
§ * † Legh, Peter, *Ivelcheſter*—a Contractor.
Leigh, Richard, *Eaſtlow*—King's Serjeant.
Lemon, William, *Penryn.*
Lenox, Lord George, *Suſſex*—Colonel of Foot.
Lethieulier, Benjamin, *Andover.*
Lewis, Edward, *Radnor.*
§ * † Linwood, Nicholas, *Aldborough*—a Contractor of Remittances to Gibraltar.
* † Liſburne, Lord Viſc. *Cardiganſh.*—Lord of the Admiralty.
Liſter, Nathaniel, *Clitheroe.*
Lockhart, Thomas, *Elgin, &c.*
Long, Sir James, *Marlborough.*
† Lowndes, Richard, *Bucks.*
§ † Lowther, Sir James, *Cockermouth*—Colonel of the Cumberland and Weſtmoreland Militia.
Ludlow, Earl of, *Huntingdonſhire.*
Luther, John, *Eſſex.*
* † Luttrell, Hen. Lawes, *Middleſex*—a Colonel in the Army, and Adjutant General in Ireland, &c.
Luttrell, Hen. F. *Minehead.*
Lynch, Sir W. *Canterbury*—Miniſter to the Court of Turin
§ * † Lyon, Hon. Tho. *Montroſs, &c.*

M.

† Mackay, M. G. *Dingwall, &c.*—Governor of Tinmouth Fort, and Colonel of Fuzileers,
§ * † Mackenzie, Right Hon. James Stewart, *Roſſhire*—Lord Privy Seal of Scotland.
† Macworth, Herbert, *Cardiff.*
§ * † Macdowall, William, *Renfrewſhire.*
§ * Manners, Lord Robert, *Kingſton*—Colonel of the Guards, and Lieut. Governor of Hull.
§ * Manners, John, *Newark*—Houſekeeper at Whitehall.
§ * Manners, George, *Scarborough*—Captain in the Army.
† Martin, Samuel, *Haſtings*—Treaſurer to P. D. of Wales.
Martin, Joſeph, *Gatton.*
Maſham, Hon. Charles, *Maidſtone.*

Maſterton,

§ * † Maſterton, James, *Inverkeithing, &c.*—Barrack Maſter Gen.
§ Macartney, Sir George,—Son-in-law to Lord Bute.
Mauger, Joſeph, *Poole.*
Mawbey, Sir Joſeph, *Southwark.*
Medley, George, *Seaford.*
Melbourne, Lord, *Luggerſhall.*
† Melliſh, Joſeph, *Grimſby.*
Meredith, Sir William, *Liverpool.*
* Methuen, Paul, *Warwick.*
Meynell, Hugo, *Limington*—Maſter of the Stag Hounds.
Milles, Richard, *Canterbury.*
Moleſworth, Sir John, *Cornwall.*
Molyneux, Viſcount, *Lancaſhire.*
§ * † Molyneux, Thomas, *Haſlemere*—a Captain in the Guards.
Molyneux, Criſpin, *Caſtleriſing.*
Montague, Fred. *Higham Ferrers.*
§ * † Montgomery, H. *Peebleſhire*—Lord Advocate of Scotland.
Mordaunt, Sir Charles, *Warwickſhire.*
† Morgan, Charles, *Brecknockſhire.*
Morgan, John, *Monmouthſhire.*
† Morrice, Right Hon. Hum. *Launceſton*—Lord Warden of the Stannaries and Steward of the D. of Cornwall.
§ * † Moreton, John, *New Romney*—Chief Juſtice of Cheſter, and Attorney Gen. to the Queen.
* Moſtyn, Sir Roger, Flintſhire—Lord Lieut. and Col. of Militia.
* † Mount Stuart, Lord, *Boſſiney.*
Monroe, Hector, *Fortroſe*, &c—Lieutenant Colonel.
† Murray. James, *Kircudbright.*
Muſgrave, George, *Carliſle.*
Middleton, Richard, *Denbigh*—Cuſtos Rotulorum and Col. of Militia.

N.

† Neſbit, Arnold, *Winchelſea.*
§ * † Neville, Richard Neville, *Taviſtock*—a Penſioner.
* Newdigate, Sir Roger, *Oxford Univerſity.*
Noel, Thomas, *Rutlandſhire.*
Norris, John, *Rye*—Governor of Deal Caſtle.
§ * † North, Lord, *Banbury*—Firſt Lord of the Treaſury.
§ * Norton, Sir Fletcher, *Guildford*—Speaker of the Houſe of Commons and Chief Juſtice in Eyre, &c.
§ * † Norton, William, *Richmond, Yorkſh.* — Miniſter to the Swiſs Cantons.
§ Nares, George, *Oxford City.*

Offley,

O.

Offley, John, *Retford.*
Oliver, Richard, *London.*
† Ongley, Robert Henley, *Bedfordſhire.*
§ * † Onſlow, Right Hon. G. *Surry*—Lord of the Treaſury.
§ * † Onſlow, G. *Guildford*—Out Ranger of Windſor Foreſt, Salary 700l. a Year, formerly only 300l.
† Oſborne, Sir G. *Boſſiney*—Groom of the Bed-chamber, and Captain of Guards.
* † Oſſory, E. of Upper, *Bedfordſhire.*
† Oſwald, James Townſhend, *Kinghorn.*
† Ourry, Paul Henry, *Plympton*—Captain of the Navy.
Owen, Sir Wm. *Pembroke*—Lieut. and Cuſt. Rot.
Owen, Hugh, *Pembrokeſhire*—Col. of Militia.

P.

Page, Francis, *Oxford Univerſity.*
Palk, Robert, *Wareham.*
Palmer, Sir John, *Leiceſterſhire.*
§ * † Palmerſton, Viſ. *Southampton*—Lord of the Admiralty.
* † Panmure, E. of, *Forfarſhire*—a Gen. and Col. of Drag.
Parker, John, *Devonſhire*—Col. of the Weſt Regiment for Devon.
§ * Parker, Hon. G. *Yarmouth*—Major Gen. and Col. of the Guards.
Pennant, Richard, *Liverpool.*
Penruddock, Charles, *Wiltſhire.*
§ Payne, Sir Ralph, *Shafteſbury*—now Knight of the Bath, and a Governor in North America.
Pennyman, Sir James, *Scarborough.*
Penton, Henry, *Wincheſter*—Letter-carrier to his Majeſty.
Piercy, E. of, *Weſtminſter*—Colonel of the 5th Regiment.
Phillips, Charles, *Camelford.*
§ * Phillips, Griffith, *Carmarthen.*
† Phillipſon, R. B. *Eye*—Lieut. Col.
Phipps, Hon. John, *Lincoln*—Captain in the Navy.
§ * † Piggot, Lord, *Bridgenorth.*
§ * † Piggot, Hugh, *Penryn*—Capt. in the Navy, and Col. of Marines.
§ * † Piggot, Rob. *Wallingford*—Lt. Col. Gov. of St. Mawes, and Warden of the Mint.
§ * Pitt, George, *Dorſetſhire*—Col. of Militia.
Pitt, Thomas, *Oakhampton.*
Plumer, William, *Hertfordſhire.*
Plumbtre, John, *Nottingham.*
Popham, Edward, *Wilts.*
Popham, Alexander, *Taunton.*

Paulet,

† Paulet, Hon. Ann. *Bridgewater.*
Powell, Harcourt, *Newtown, Hants.*
Powlett, Geo. *Wincheſter*—Groom Porter to the King, and Gent. Uſher to the Princeſs Dow. of Wales.
Pownall, Thomas. *Tregony.*
Pratt, Rob. *Horſham*—Maſter in Chancery.
Price, Chaſe, *Radnorſhire.*
§ * † Pringle, James, *Berwickſhire*—Col. and Maſter of the Works in Scotland.
§ * † Pringle, John, *Selkirkſhire*—Conſul of Madeira.
Pryce, J. Pugh, *Merionethſhire.*
† Pye, Adm. T. *Rocheſter*—Vice Adm. of the Red.
* Pultney, W. *Cromartiſhire.*

R

Radcliffe, John, *St. Albans.*
Raſhleigh, Philip, *Fowey.*
* Rebow, Iſaac Martin, *Colcheſter.*
§ * † Reynolds, Fr. *Lancaſter*—Provoſt Marſhal of Barbadoes.
§ * † Rice, Right Hon. G. *Carmarthenſhire*—Treaſurer of the King's Chamber.
Ridley, Sir M. White, *Morpeth.*
Ridley, Matt. *Newcaſtle upon Tyne.*
§ * † Rigby, Rt. Hon. R. *Taviſtock*—Pay-maſter of the Forces, Maſter of the Rolls in Ireland, &c. &c.
§ † Roberts, John, *Harwich*—Commiſſioner of Trade.
§ * † Robinſon, John, *Weſtmoreland*—Secretary to the Treaſury.
Rodney, Sir G. *Northampton*,—V. Adm. of the Red, and R. Adm. of Great Britain.
Rolle, Denys, *Barnſtaple.*
§ * † Roſs, John, *Lancaſhire*—Captain in the Navy.
Rumbold, Thomas, *Shoreham,*
Ruſhout, John, *Eveſham.*
† Rider, Nathaniel, *Tiverton.*

S.

St. Aubyn, Sir John, *Cornwall.*
St. Leger, Anthony, *Grimſby.*
§ * † St. John, Henry, *Wotton Baſſet.*
Saunders, Sir Charles, *Heydon*—Admiral, and Lieutenant General of Marines.
Salte, Samuel, *Leſkard.*
Savile, Sir G. *Yorkſhire*—Col. of Militia.
Sawbridge, John, *Hythe*—Lieut. Col. of Militia.
Scawen, James, *St. Michael.*
† Scott, John, *Fifeſhire*—Major Gen. and Col. of Foot.
Scrope, Thomas, *Lincoln.*

Scu-

§ * † Scudamore, Charles, *Heyteſbury*—Dep. Ranger of Whittlebury Foreſt, and Curſitor of the Chancery in Ireland.
Scudamore, John, *Hereford.*
§ * † Seabright, Sir John, *Bath*—Lieut. Gen. and Col. of Foot.
§ * † Selwyn, G. *Glouceſter*—Surveyor of the Mint, Pay-maſter of the Board of Works, and Regiſter of the Chancery in Barbadoes.
Seamour, Henry, *Huntingdon.*
§ * † Shelly, Sir John, *Newark*—Treaſurer of the Houſhold, Keeper of the Records in the Tower, and Clerk of the Pipe in the Exchequer.
Skipwith, Thomas G. *Warwickſhire.*
Skynner, John, *Woodſtock*, Attorney Gen. to the Duchy of Lancaſter.
* † Sloane, Hans, *Newport, Hants.*—Dep. Coff. to his Majeſty.
Smith, John, *Bath.*
* Southwell, Edw. *Glouceſterſhire.*
* † Spencer, Lord Ch. *Oxfordſhire*—Lord of the Admiralty.
Spencer, Lord R. *Oxford*—a Lord of Trade.
Standert, Fred. *Bleckingly.*
§ * † Stanley, Right Hon. Hans. *Southampton*—Cofferer of the Houſhold, and Governor of the Iſle of Wight.
* Staunton, Thomas, *Ipſwich.*
† Staverdale, Lord, *Midhurſt.*
§ * † Stephenſon, John, *St. Michael*—a Contractor.
Stepney, John, *Monmouth.*
§ * † Stephens, Philip, *Sandwich*—Secretary to the Admiralty.
§ * † Stuart, Hon. James, *Irvine, &c.*—2d Son of Lord Bute.
§ * Stuart, Hon. Keith, *Wigtonſh*—Captain in the Navy.
Stuart, William, *Wigton.*
Stuart, John, *Arundel.*
Strachey, Henry, *Pontefract.*
§ * Stuart, Sir Sim. *Hampſh.*—Chamberlain of the Exchequer
Sturt, Humphry, *Dorſetſhire.*
† Sulivan, Lawrence, *Aſhburton.*
§ * Suttie, Sir George, *Haddingtonſhire.*
Sutton, Lord George, *Grantham.*
Sutton, James, junior, *Devizes.*
Sutton, Richard, *St. Albans*—Under Secretary of State, and Counſel to the Board of Ordnance.
Sykes, Francis, *Shafteſbury.*
Symons, Richard, *Hereford.*

T

* Taylor, Rob. Paris, *Berwick.*
Tempeſt, John, *Durham City.*
* Thomond, E. of *Winchelſea*—Lord Lieut. of Somerſetſh.

Thompſon,

Thompſon, Beilby, *Heydon.*
Thoroton, Thomas, *Bramber.*
§ * † Thrale, Henry, *Southwark.*
§ * † Thurlow, Edw. *Tamworth*—Attorney General.
Tonſon, Richard, *Windſor.*
Townſend, James, *Weſtlow.*
Townſhend, Hon. T. *Camb. Univerſity*—a Teller in the Exchequer,
Townſhend, Thomas, *Whitchurch.*
† Townſhend, Ch. *Yarmouth,* Commiſ. of the Treaſury.
Trecothick, Barlow, *London.*
§ * † Tucker, John, *Weymouth,* &c.—Pay-maſter of Marines.
§ * Tudway, Clement, *Wells.*
Turner, Sir John, *King's Lynn,*
Turner, Charles, *York.*
§ * Tynte, Sir Ch. *Somerſetſhire*—Col. of Militia.

V.

* † Vane, Hon. Fred. *Durham*—Maſter of the Jewel Office, and Deputy Treaſurer of Chelſea Hoſpital.
Van Neck, G. Wm. *Dunwich.*
§ * † Vanſittart, Arthur, *Berks*—Col. of the Berkſhire Militia.
Verney, Lord, *Buckinghamſhire.*
Vernon, Hon. George, *Glamorganſhire.*
§ * † Vernon, Rd. *Bedford*—Clerk of the Board of Green Cloth.
Vernon, Charles, *Tamworth*—Maj. Gen. and Lt. of Foot.
Vincent, Sir Francis, *Surry.*

W.

Wallace, James, *Horſham*—King's Counſel, and Attorney Gen. for Durham and Lancaſter.
§ * Waller, Rob. *Chipping Wycomb*—Maſter of St. Catherines.
Wallop, Hon. Hen. *Whitchurch*—Groom of the Bed-chamb.
† Walpole, Hon. Thomas, *King's Lynn.*
† Walpole, Hon. Richard, *Yarmouth, Nor.*
Walſh, John, *Worceſter.*
Walſingham, Rd. Boyle, *Knareſborough*—Cap. in the Navy.
Walter, John, *Exeter.*
Walter, Edward, *Milbourn Port.*
§ * Waltham, Lord, *Weymouth, &c.*
§ * Ward, Hon. John, *Worceſter.*
§ * Warren, Sir George, *Lancaſter.*
† Warrender, Pat. *Dunbar, &c.*—Lieut. Col. and King's Remembrancer in the Court of Exquequer in Scotland.
§ * † Webb, Nathaniel, *Taunton.*
Weddell, William, *Kingſton*

§ * † Wedderburn, Alex. *Biſhop's Caſtle*—Solicitor General.
§ * † Wemyſs, Hon. James, *Southerlanſh.*—Officer in the Navy.
Wenman, Viſcount, *Oxfordſhire.*
Weſt, James, *Burroughbridge.*
† Whately, Tho. *Caſtlerising*—Under Sec. of State, &c. &c.
Whichcot, Thomas, *Lincolnſhire.*
* Whitbread, Samuel, *Bedford.*
Whitmore, Thomas, *Bridgenorth*—Major of Foot.
§ * † Whitſhed, James, *Cirenceſter.*
§ * † Whitworth, Sir Charles, *Minehead*—Chairman of Ways and Means.
Whitworth, Richard, *Stafford.*
† Wilkinſon, Andrew, *Aldborough.*
Williams, Sir Hugh, *Beaumarris*—Officer in the Army.
Willoughby, Hon. Thomas, *Nottinghamſhire.*
Wilſon, William, *Camelford.*
§ * Winnington, Sir Edward, *Brackley.*
§ * Woolaſton, Wm. *Ipſwich*—Colonel of Militia.
Worge, Richard, *Stockbridge*—Major General.
§ * † Worſley, Tho. *Callington*—Surv. of the Board of Works.
Wray, Sir Cecil, *Retford.*
§ * † Wrotteſley, Sir John, *Staffordſh.*—Col. in the Guards.
§ † Wyldbore, Matthew, *Peterborough.*
§ * Wynne, Thomas, *Carnarvonſh.*—Auditor of the Land Revenues in Wales.
§ * Wynne, Glynn, *Carnarvon*—Colonel in the Army.

Y.

Yonge, Sir George, *Honiton.*
Yorke, Sir Joſeph, *Dover*—Miniſter to the States-General, and Lieut. General, &c.
Yorke, Hon. John, *Ryegate*—Clerk of the Crown.

Upon a review of this liſt it appears, that there are 230 members in the Houſe of Commons who actually enjoy places of great emolument or honour. In this number there are 95 officers of the army and navy, including ſome few of the militia. Many of theſe, beſides their military pay, hold very lucrative offices at court, and in almoſt every department of ſtate. There are alſo 64 brothers and ſons of peers. Thus a majority of our repreſentatives hold places of honour or emolument at the diſpoſal

of

of the crown: not to mention thoſe private douceurs given at the end of the ſeſſion to proſtitute men, whom the court hold cheap enough annually to buy; as well as thoſe temporary gratuities which the miniſter can daily beſtow to anſwer an immediate neceſſity, or carry any urgent queſtion in the houſe.

If upon the preceding reaſoning, and this ſtate of facts, we remain ſenſeleſs of the danger that threatens our liberties, and inattentive to the beſt intereſts and moſt important concerns of human life, we deſerve to feel the ſeverity of deſpotiſm, and wear the chains of ſlavery, which wicked and ambitious men, if not checked and controuled, will forge for our necks.—I have offered theſe things to my countrymen, from a ſenſe of that duty which I owe to them and myſelf.—If we fall by the ruinous attacks made upon our liberties by thoſe who ſhould protect them; if the deſtructive ſyſtem now adopted and purſued ſhould be entirely eſtabliſhed, I ſhall have one conſolation at leaſt remaining after liberty is gone; which is, that I have done every thing in my power to prevent its deſtruction. Would to God my countrymen would do every thing in their's.

FINIS.

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